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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three theoretical essays on institutions and economic growth.
Chapter 1 considers a particular institution: ethnicity. Ethnic, religious and tribal divisions
are empirically associated with economic underdevelopment. I construct a model in which
groups form endogenously to enable cooperation between their members in a prisoner's dilemma.
Groups sustain trust through monitoring, whereas only the Nash equilibrium, trade, is possible
in an anonymous market. Optimal group size trades off the benefits of increased scale and
the costs of reduced ability to detect cheating. Inter-group hostility can enable each group to
enforce more trusting behavior between its own members. Even if groups may form optimally,
in equilibrium they may persist inefficiently.
Chapters 2 and 3 consider some distributional implications of technical change in a model
with human capital. Both chapters distinguish between general skills, that are equally useful
with any vintage of technology, and specific skills, that are associated with a particular vintage.
In Chapter 2, I construct a model of slow technology diffusion. In developing countries,
diffusion takes the form of a "dual economy", in which a gradually increasing fraction of workers
use modern technology, while the remainder use traditional technology. Intermediate technolo-
gies are never used. During the transition, wages of specific-skill workers fall, as workers with
general skills disproportionately join the modern sector. The model can also be applied to
technology diffusion in developed countries.
Chapter 3 asks why, early in the modern era, technical change was primarily deskilling,
while in the modern era it is skill-biased. Whereas previous explanations have focused on
changes in technology, this paper suggests that changes in skills themselves were important.
High-skill workers invest in specific skills if technical change is slow, and in general skills if it
is rapid. This generates a U-shaped relationship between the rate of technical change and
the skill-premium. Moreover, with low rates of technical change the modern sector is unskill-
intensive, whereas the reverse is true when technical change is faster. The predictions of the
model are compared with the historical experience.
Thesis Supervisor: Daron Acemoglu
Title: Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics
Thesis Supervisor: Abhijit Banerjee
Title: Ford International Professor of Economics
3

Acknowledgements
Writing a doctorate can sometimes be a lonely activity, but it is not one that can be
undertaken alone. I have therefore been fortunate over my time at MIT to have benefitted
from much help and support both from people at MIT and from further afield.
I would like to thank the Reserve Bank of Australia for financial support that enabled me
to pursue this PhD. I owe a debt of gratitude to the RBA that I hope some day to repay. I
would also like to thank the Department of Economics at MIT for awarding me a fellowship.
At MIT, I would like to thank the staff and faculty at the Department of Economics for
making this the great place to learn that it is. I owe a special debt to my advisers. Ivan
Werning asked a thousand sceptical and difficult questions, and expanded my horizons beyond
Cambridge. Abhijit Banerjee helped me see the interesting questions and often pointed me
towards more interesting answers. Daron Acemoglu was never less than an exacting taskmaster,
for which I particularly thank him. His intellectual energy and curiosity were an inspiration
throughout my time at MIT.
I would also like to thank many classmates and friends. Justin Wolfers, John Romalis and
Jonathan Kearns helped me make it to MIT in the first place and then to settle in when I got
here. My office-mates for the past three years, Bill Kerr and Byron Lutz, have shared good
offices and bad, days when the phone rang and days when it didn't, and many conversations at
least some of which were about economics. For their friendship, support and advice I would
also like to thank Matilde Bombardini, Guy Debelle, the Fellas, Andrew Hertzberg, Geraint
Jones, Daniel Paravisini, Bruce Preston, Veronica Rappoport, James Vickery and many others.
Many thanks of course to Mum and Dad and to Nana, who have always believed in me and
supported me. Thanks also to Amelia, whose unexpected proximity for the past four years has
been a tremendous good fortune for me.
Finally, my heart-felt thanks go to Nancy for her patience, understanding and love.
5

Contents
1 Trade and the End of Trust: Endogenous Group Formation and Inter-Group
Hostility
1.1 Introduction ..............
1.2 Group Formation ...........
1.2.1 The Environment .......
1.2.2 Equilibrium ..........
1.2.3 Optimal Group Size .....
1.2.4 Equilibrium Group Formation.
1.3 Defensive Group Strategies ......
1.4 Social Welfare .............
1.5 Non-Stationarity and Shocks .....
1.6 Discussion: France and Rwanda ....
1.6.1 France, 1870-1914 .......
1.6.2 Rwanda, 1860 to 1961 .....
1.6.3 Other Evidence ........
1.7 Conclusion ...............
10
11
16
16
22
25
31
35
38
42
45
46
48
50
52
2 Inequality and the Dual Economy:
General Skills
2.1 Introduction .............
2.2 The Static Model ..........
2.2.1 A Graphical Representation
Technology Adoption with Specific and
59
60
63
63
7
........................
........................
........................
........................
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
.............
.............
.............
.............
.............
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
2.2.2 Production .........................
2.2.3 Technology Choice ....................
2.2.4 Static Equilibrium .....................
2.2.5 Comparative Statics ....................
2.3 Dynamics. .............................
2.3.1 A fixed frontier .......................
2.3.2 A moving frontier .....................
2.4 Extensions. .............................
2.4.1 Supply Responses ....................
2.4.2 Experience Effects ....................
2.4.3 More than one good, trade and empirical applications .
2.5 Conclusion .............................
2.6 Mathematical Appendix ......................
2.6.1 Social Planner's Problem .................
3 When and Why did Technical Change Become Skill-Biased?
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
3.2 A Simple Model ...........................
3.2.1 The Environment .....................
3.2.2 Equilibrium .........................
3.3 Endogenous Technical Progress ..................
3.3.1 Equilibrium .........................
3.3.2 Discussion. .........................
3.4 Education Provision .......................
3.5 Conclusion .............................
... . . . . . . . 68
. . . . . . . . . . 70
... . . . . . . . 74
... . . . . . . . 77
... . . . . . . . 78
... . . . . . . . 80
... . . . . . . . 85
... . . . . . . . 85
... . . . . . . . 86
... . . . . . . . 86
... . . . . . . . 88
... . . . . . . . 90
... . . . . . . . 90
96
... . . . . . . . 96
... . . . . . . . 100
... . . . . . . . 100
... . . . . . . . 102
... . . . . . . . 108
... . . . . . . . 110
... . . . . . . . 113
... . . . . . . . 114
... . . . . . . . 116
8
AA
List of Figures
Groups and the Market ..........
Incentive Compatibility and Group Size .
Social and Private Efficiency of Groups 
...................... 18
...................... 31
...................... 40
Equilibrium with Two Technologies ....
Intermediate Technologies .........
An Equilibrium Dual Economy ......
Balanced Growth with a Moving Frontier
64
65
66
83
3-1 Equilibrium Rate of Technical Progress .....
3-2 Multiple Equilibrium Rates of Technical Progress
... . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .114
... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .115
9
1-1
1-2
1-3
2-1
2-2
2-3
2-4
Chapter 1
Trade and the End of Trust:
Endogenous Group Formation and
Inter-Group Hostility
Summary 1 Ethnic, religious and tribal divisions are empirically associated with economic
underdevelopment. To investigate this relationship, I construct a model in which groups form
endogenously as an alternative to an anonymous market. Groups sustain trust, the good outcome
in a Prisoner's Dilemma, through monitoring, whereas only the Nash equilibrium, trade, is
possible in the market. Optimal group size trades off the benefits of increased scale and the
costs of reduced ability to detect cheating. I derive conditions under which groups are socially
optimal, and conversely, groups form but are socially ineJfficient. Hostility between groups can
arise as a by-product of group formation because it enables the group to enforce more trusting
behavior between its own members. More infrequent contact between groups and technology that
increases the extent of scale economies each lead to greater inter-group hostility. They also raise
the probability that groups are socially inefficient. A non-stationary extension highlights that
even groups that were efficient when they formed may persist after they become highly inefficient.
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1.1 Introduction
Ethnic, religious and tribal divisions are empirically associated with economic underdevelop-
ment. Starting with Easterly and Levine (1997), a series of articles has highlighted the negative
correlation between economic outcomes and various measures of fractionalization. 1 One ob-
vious source of this association is ethnic conflict, which has come to considerable prominence
since the end of the Cold War. However, even when actual violence is absent, fractionaliza-
tion appears to have a range of negative effects, including inadequate provision of public goods
and poor economic growth.2 Most of the economics literature examining this relationship has
focused on inter-group hostility, while treating ethnic groups themselves as exogenous. 3 In
contrast, most social scientists - sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists - do not
view ethnic groups as exogenous or "primordial." Rather, they are "constructivists": they see
ethnic and other social groups as constructed by their members. 4
What can we learn about the economic effects of ethnic and other groups if we view them,
not as exogenous, but as social constructs? Can this approach help us to understand the sources
of inter-group conflict? I model group formation as a response to economic opportunities, such
as the extent of returns to specialization and the efficiency of access to markets. In this setting,
groups can become hostile to outsiders as a way of ensuring the loyalty of their own members.
Hostility is a strategy that only arises either when it is needed to maintain group loyalty or when
the cost of hostility is low, because, for example, the group rarely interacts with outsiders. This
solves Fearon and Laitin's (1996) "puzzle" of inter-ethnic cooperation: their observation that,
although inter-ethnic hostility occurs frequently, lack of conflict between groups is probably
even more widespread. The model suggests that optimal policies towards groups depend on
the setting which created the group, and that it may be more productive to try to change the
economic setting than to focus on group behaviour directly.
'See also Alesina et.al. (2003), Aghion et.al. (2004), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2003).
2Some recent evidence on this is provided in Banerjee and Somanathan (2004).
3In addition to the empirical work discussed above, theoretical contributions include Esteban and Ray (1999),
Acemoglu et.al. (2004) and Padro-i-Miquel (2004).
4For discussions of ethnicity and constructivism, see Chandra (2001) and Bates (forthcoming). Eltringham
(2004) highlights the malleability of ethnicity by listing eleven associated characteristics, none of which are
necessary or sufficient in themselves. Even kinship or shared ancestry is a constructed concept: Bates refers
to a "mythology of consanguinity (quoted in Horowitz (1985), p60)," echoing Weber (1968), who stressed the
importance of "a subjective belief in ... common descent" (p 38 9).
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In modelling groups, I draw on the well-established view that groups sustain trust amongst
their members in economic transactions. Horowitz (1985), in his study of ethnic conflict,
argues that "In the West, most tasks outside the home are performed by organizations not
based on kinship. The same is simply not true in Asia and Africa... One reason for the
difference is capacity: extended families are able to help their members in more transactions
than nuclear families are (p63)." Trust may take many forms depending on the nature of the
economic interaction involved. For example, Banerjee and Munshi (2004) find evidence that
the Gounders who dominate the knitted garment industry in Tirupur, India, extend credit more
readily to other Gounders than to outsiders. Moreover, it seems clear that groups sustain trust
amongst their members through extensive circulation of information. For instance, Fafchamps
(2004) finds evidence of information sharing and client referral amongst four distinct groups of
Kenyan Asians involved in manufacturing.
The model reflects the idea that ethnic groups try to sustain trust amongst as many people
as possible by circulating information. The production structure draws on Dixit (2003a).
Agents are matched randomly each period and then play a prisoner's dilemma. Cooperation is
sustained because unilateral deviations can be detected and the rest of the group informed. The
probability with which a deviation is detected declines as the group expands. The productivity
of a particular match depends on the characteristics of the partners, represented as distance
from each other. In larger populations, agents can be further apart, and therefore the best
possible matches are more valuable. However, because matching is random, the best matches
do not always occur. It follows that, as population expands, the value of the best, or marginal,
match increases faster than the value of the average match. Consequently, in sufficiently large
populations, trust cannot be sustained in the most valuable transactions. Moreover, further
expansion of the group reduces the quality of information and therefore the extent of trust.
Accordingly, if there is an optimal group, it is finite.
Agents can also interact in an anonymous marketplace. Since it is anonymous, no trust
can be sustained in the market. The market has two roles. First, even agents who prefer
to trade within their group sometimes have to interact with members of other groups in the
market. Second, it provides the autarky option for group members who have been caught
cheating within their group.
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One of the most important results of the paper is that inter-group hostility can arise because
reducing the value of the market increases the ability of the group to sustain trust amongst its
members. Therefore, if the marginal member is sufficiently valuable to the group, the group
will try to reduce the value of market trades, a strategy I interpret as inter-group hostility.
Groups can do this because the game includes multiple, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria, as in a
co-ordination game.
This interpretation of inter-group conflict supports views that emphasize rational actors
constructing ethnic identity "on the ground." This contrasts with most existing papers, which
feature exogenous groups and argue that hostility is fomented primarily by elites to serve their
own purposes. 6 One example of violence constructed on the ground is given by Fearon and
Laitin (2000). Basque separatists, concerned that their fellow Basques were assimilating into
the Spanish population, provoked the central Spanish authorities into taking action that they
knew would antagonize previously assimilationist Basques. Ganguly (1997) has made similar
arguments about Sikh revivalism in Punjab and Muslim fundamentalism in Kashmir.
In addition to suggesting a new interpretation of inter-group hostility, the model generates
a number of comparative static predictions of interest. These relate in particular to changes
in returns to scale and efficiency of matching, on the one hand, and changes in the probability
of interaction with the market on the other. Increases in returns to scale and the efficiency of
matching (that is, a greater probability of meeting distant trading partners) place pressure on
groups because they raise the return to being in a larger population, such as the market. If the
increases are large enough, groups may disintegrate entirely, and the economy can efficiently
shift to a market equilibrium. Smaller increases raise the probability that, if groups persist,
they are socially inefficient relative to the market equilibrium. In these circumstances, the
group is particularly eager to sustain trust as broadly as possible, and accordingly inter-group
hostility increases. Increases in the probability of interaction with the market do not affect
the value of the market equilibrium, but they do make the survival of socially inefficient groups
more likely. Moreover, they also raise inter-group hostility. Intuitively, a given degree of
5The mechanism is in some ways similar to Tirole (1996), in that it relies on group members being imperfectly
distinguished by outsiders. Outsiders must therefore rely on the group's collective reputation when choosing
their strategy.
6For analyses of ethnic hostility fomented by an elite, see Padro-i-Miquel (2004) and Acemoglu et.al. (2004).
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hostility reduces the autarky value of group members by the same amount regardless of how
segregated the group is, but is cheaper to inflict for groups that interact with the outside world
less frequently.
The model therefore yields insights into the circumstances under which groups persist or
dissolve. The non-stationary section of the paper highlights that even if groups originally form
optimally, they can persist inefficiently when circumstances change, and this persistence itself
leads to additional inter-group hostility. Nevertheless, ethnic groups can in fact change quite
rapidly.7 For example, although most modern European countries appear to be relatively
homogeneous, in some cases this is a surprisingly recent development. France, for example,
became dramatically more homogeneous during the late nineteenth century. Conversely, many
of the chronic ethnic problems of modern Africa also turn out to be of surprisingly recent
provenance, concerning groups that took their modern form only during or after the colonial
period.
This is consistent with the prediction of the model that change is most likely when technology
or infrastructure changes substantially, for example during the Industrial Revolution in Europe
or the colonial period in Africa. Moreover, groups are more likely to be replaced by the market
when these changes are accompanied by policies that reduce the ability of groups to distribute
information, and by integrationist policies more broadly. In much of Europe, these conditions
were present and groups largely dissolved. By contrast, in much of Africa, introduction of new
technology and infrastructure was more limited, and policies often explicitly favored ethnic
division. Groups therefore persisted and became more hostile. In confronting modern ethnic
divisions, the model highlights that new technology and infrastructure can be as important
in causing a shift to the market as policies more obviously directed at groups. For example,
building a road and a market place where exchange can take place may be a more productive
way of reducing group conflict than encouraging negotiations between group leaders.
This paper is related to a number of existing strands of the literature. The role of groups
in sustaining trust has been extensively investigated. In Dixit (2003a), although no groups
can form, small populations can sustain trust by informal enforcement: an agent whose part-
ner has cheated informs other agents with a probability that declines with distance. Larger
7 The following examples are discussed more extensively in Section 6.
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populations do better by relying on a costly external enforcement mechanism, such as a formal
legal system. Putnam (2000) is a well known sociological analysis of groups and trust. Avner
Greif (1994) and Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) consider medieval merchant traders, who
sustained trust by forming guilds, or through an ethnic group, the Maghribi. Fafchamps (2004)
provides an extensive discussion of various forms of trust in economic transactions in develop-
ing countries. Theoretical investigations of groups and trust include Ellison (1994) and Ghosh
and Ray (1996). Kranton (1997), who compares anonymous market exchange with ongoing
non-market interactions, is closer in spirit to the present paper. But since all exchange in
her model is between ongoing bilateral trading partners, neither the scope of the group nor
interaction between groups can be considered.
Although economists have recently become more interested in ethnic groups, only Caselli
and Coleman (2003) endogenize ethnic group formation. However, in their paper, groups exist
purely to extract rents, so society as a whole would always strictly benefit from the elimination
of groups. Moreover, the number of ethnic groups, although not the size of each, is exogenous.
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) describe optimal country formation subject to exogenous ethnic
divisions, but their work assumes differences in preferences across groups.
Another related literature considers club goods, although in that literature the optimal size
of a group is determined directly by congestion costs.8 However, some of the club good literature
does raise the possibility of apparently self-destructive actions as a way of committing to the
group.9 Finally, the observation that, in problems of limited commitment, improvements in
the autarky option can reduce welfare has previously been made both in the macroeconomic
literature on insurance with limited commitment and in the industrial organization literature
on relational contracting. 1 0
Section 2 of the paper introduces the stationary model of group formation. Section 3
shows how inter-group hostility arises naturally out of this model. Section 4 considers the
social welfare implications of group formation. Section 5 considers the non-stationary model.
This setting magnifies the potential for inefficiency and hostility seen in the stationary model.
8For an overview of club theory, see Sandler and Tschirhart (1997).
9See Berman (2000) for a discussion of this behaviour in the context of Israeli ultra-orthdox Jews.
'°See Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002) and Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) for the insurance problem, and
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) and Levin (2003) on relational contracting.
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Section 6 discusses the model in the context of several case studies of ethnic groups, focusing
particularly on the homogenization of France in the late nineteenth century and the development
of the divide between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda at a similar time. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Group Formation
1.2.1 The Environment
Production Locations
There is an ex ante homogeneous set of agents of mass 2L. Despite dealing with a continuum of
agents, in the body of the paper I will refer to decisions made by "individuals" or "agents" for
the sake of readability. Agents die and are replaced at a constant rate, 6o and also discount the
future, so that their effective discount factor is . Agents maximize expected lifetime utility,
E E 6tu (ct) 
t
All payoffs are specified in units of utility. At birth, agents can choose to join a group. This
choice is irrevocable, in the sense that there is an infinite cost of switching groups.
Agents interact with each other in one of two types of locations. These need not be
geographically distinct from each other, although they may be. Interactions can be considered
as either a form of trade or a form of joint production. The first location, the market, is
potentially inhabited by all agents. Actions within the market are anonymous except that the
group to which an agent belongs can be observed. The second location is associated with the
particular group to which an agent belongs. An agent who is a member of a group can seek
interactions in the market or within the group. If they seek interactions in the market, they
find the market with probability one.11 If they seek interactions in the group, they find the
group with probability p and the market with probability 1 -p.
Although more general imperfect search processes could be specified, this simple specifi-
cation makes two key points. First, although the group is effective at excluding outsiders,
" Actually, probability 1-e, although except in the section dealing with equilibrium group formation I consider
only the limiting case as -- 0.
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it cannot entirely avoid contact with outsiders in other settings. This assumption is needed
so that there is some interaction between members of different groups: otherwise inter-group
relations are moot. Second, members of the group have some control over whether they find
the group or the market in a given period. This generates a limited commitment problem for
members of the group.
Matching and Production
Regardless of where an agent finds themself in a given period, production takes the same
physical form, drawn largely from Dixit (2003a). Agents in the locale are arranged uniformly
around a circle of circumference 2Pit, where 2PIt is the mass of agents in locale in period t.
(For convenience, I will refer to this circle as being of "size" P.) The distance between any
two agents is the shorter of the two arcs between them on the circle. This distance represents
differences between agents that can be exploited in production or trade. One interpretation
is that, although all agents are ex ante homogeneous, they can specialize in some quasi-fixed
characteristic such as occupation, or some endowment of human and/or natural resources.
Agents who are further apart from each other are therefore more different from each other in
some relevant dimension, although all agents are ex ante alike.
Figure 1.1 depicts an equilibrium in which all agents have joined one of four groups, and
seek the groups each period. The size of group A each period is G. The market consists solely
of failed searches for the group, and is therefore of size (1 -p) L.
Each period, each agent is randomly matched with another agent around the circle, and can,
if they wish to do so, engage in an interaction, the product of which is immediately consumed.
(Recall that utility is linear in payoffs.) An agent's utility in the period is normalized to zero
if either they are not matched with anyone, or they are matched but one or both parties to the
match choose not to interact.
The probability of meeting an agent at distance x is
ce- x
2 '
where ca/2 is a rescaling constant to ensure that the aggregate meeting probability is less than
17
G(1-p)L
Figure 1-1: Groups and the Market
one, and > 0. ca is a localization parameter: a greater value of ca raises the probability
of nearby matches relative to distant matches. Lower values of a are associated with more
effective search. This might occur for a variety of reasons: information about favorable trading
opportunities may disseminate more effectively, or roads and other physical infrastructure might
bring otherwise distant traders effectively closer together.
There is no crowding out: adding extra agents to the population does not change the
probability of meeting an agent at a given distance. This simplification necessarily implies
that in any finite population the probability of a match in each period is less than one. In fact,
the aggregate meeting probability is
Pit oae-Cx
2 2 dx = I - e - Pt.
2
A greater value of a therefore also raises the probability of matching in a given period for
any finite population. Because has the dual role of controlling localization and aggregate
18
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meeting probability, some of the comparative statics with respect to ca will be ambiguous. 12
For sufficiently large populations, however, the effect of a on localization is more important
than its effect on aggregate meeting probabilities. 1 3
If they choose to interact, agents play a game in which the payoff to player j is
1rj (aj, a-j IQ)ex,
where 7rj (aj, a-jIQ,) is a constant determined by the actions of player j, aj, and player -j,
aj, which may be conditional on any information the two players have about each other, Q1,
including the distance from each other, x. ex is a multiplicative factor that depends on the
distance between the two players. Assume that 0 > 0, which implies that more distant trades
are potentially more valuable, so that there are increasing returns to scale in group size.
Increasing returns to scale are derived from the ex post heterogeneity previously discussed.
The exact source of the returns to scale depends on the nature of the interaction between the
players. In a trade setting, two agents growing different strains of wheat might stand to gain
little from meeting, while a wheat farmer and a cattle farmer might expect large gains from
trade. In a production setting, owners of different complementary factors will gain more from
meeting than two owners of the same factor. Similarly, the return to meeting someone in a
dissimilar occupation is probably greater than that to meeting someone in the same occupation:
an architect might gain more from meeting an engineer than from meeting another architect.
Although at some point it might be possible to imagine two trading partners who are actually
too different from each other, all that is needed for the results is that interactions are increasing
in value up to a sufficiently great distance. Following Dixit, assume that > 0, so that
expected utility does not increase infinitely as the population grows infinitely large.
The constant rj (aj, aj) is determined by the players' choice of actions according to the
12 Note that these roles are contradictory rather than reinforcing: greater ca raises aggregate meeting probability
but reduces the distance of those matches that occur.
13Normalising meeting probabilities along the lines of Dixit (2003a), so that the probability of a match at
distance x is
-aea
2(1 - e-Pit)
would greatly complicate the solution without adding much intuition. Such a modification would actually
encourge finite group formation along the lines to be discussed.
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table below. The players' choice of strategies is the set aj E { [0, A], C}. This represents two
types of strategies. The choice of C, for co-operation, corresponds to fully trusting the other
player. It is the good outcome in a prisoner's dilemma (so T + > T), and the social optimum is
for both players to play C. Any action s E [0, A] is a variety of trade. Within trade, there is
a pure co-ordination game, so that any value of trade up to A < T can be sustained as a Nash
equilibrium. While the choice of 0 is an arbitrary normalization in the co-ordination game, it
is important that T- is less than the minimum payoff to Trade, so that Trust can never be a
Nash equilibrium. An equilibrium in which agents play less than A will be taken to represent
inter-group hostility. For now, assume that all agents co-ordinate their strategy on a fixed
value of A < A when not playing trust.
Trust (C) Trade (2)
Trust (C)
Trade (i) T+,T- S i, S j fs< s A C{1, 2}
0 if S > _j
There are two key parts to this game. The first is the prisoner's dilemma, while the second is
the coordination game, which creates multiple, Pareto-ranked one-shot equilibria. Intuitively,
groups form to enable their members to reach the good outcome in the prisoner's dilemma,
while the coordination game allows the group to pursue a range of strategies with respect to
the outside world.14
Both of these elements seem reasonable in the types of economies under consideration.
The desirability of maintaining trust in economic interactions is well understood and fairly
intuitive. For instance, in either credit markets or joint production, returns are higher if
a partner can be trusted to perform without monitoring. Similarly, specifying a complete
contract is costly, and parties who trust each other may prefer to leave the contract unspecified.
Economic relations involving ethnic groups or kinship groups often take this form. For example,
Geertz (1963) describes how in Bali kinship groups assemble from time to time to produce
large gamelan (percussion instruments). Although some payments are made, capital is shared
14 Formally, Section 3 will show that the group uses the multiplicity of Pareto-ranked equilibria to sustain
different degrees of trust (equilibrium payoffs) inside the group. The strategy is therefore similar to that
considered by Benoit and Krishna (1985) in finitely repeated games.
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T, T T-,T +
sjissjfi }
and participation is seen as a moral responsibility of group members (pp93-6). This may
be presumed to be a more efficient arrangement than hiring workers whose tasks need to be
contracted upon and performance monitored.
Continuing with the gamelan example, if a worker is hired on a spot market, so that trust
cannot be sustained, there may be many tasks they could be assigned. Both their wage and
their task will depend on their employer's expectation of their capability and honesty. Each of
these combinations of tasks and wages could correspond to a different coordination equilibrium.
If the employer has a low opinion of their new employee's likely capability, they may use them
purely in menial tasks. If they have a higher opinion of their employee, they may trust them
with more important tasks relating to the manufacturing itself. Given that the employee is
hired only once, there may be no opportunity to discover that a poor opinion of their abilities
was misplaced. Similarly, in credit markets, if a creditor has a low opinion of a lender's
trustworthiness, they may limit lending and impose onerous conditions on the lender to ensure
repayment.
Information
Trading partners in the market have no individual information about each other. They can ob-
serve which group their trading partner joined at birth, although not their current status within
the group. The only other information available to market participants is an announcement
made by each group at the start of the period as to which strategy its members will pursue in
the market that period.
The group can sustain trust because it can transmit information. Within the group, the
flow of information is costless, so that effectively any necessary announcement can be made
by a central authority at the end of each period. The group gathers information only about
transactions within its location. For simplicity, all actions associated with monitoring are
costless. The quality of monitoring deteriorates when more members are added to the group,
so that the probability of being caught after having cheated is
21
where m is just a multiplicative constant, : > 0 and G is the total size of the group. The
probability of an erroneous adverse finding is zero.
If an agent is caught cheating, they are immediately given a record that is publicly available
to all group members in the future. This is denoted
Rj E {0,1}
where Rj = if a member has been caught cheating, and Rj = 0 otherwise.
An investigation is launched only if one of the agents complains. Complainants are as-
sumed to be exactly indifferent about complaining: no cost is involved, but nor is there any
compensation if the complaint is upheld. If an agent complains, the other agent may launch a
counter-complaint. Hence, an agent will not complain unless a deviation has been unilateral.
This is important, since under some circumstances groups will wish to include some interactions
in which neither agent plays Trust. Without this mechanism, such interactions would involve
the risk of expulsion from the group.
There are many reasons why information might deteriorate with group size. For example, a
single agent, such as a chief, will find monitoring more and more diverse specialities increasingly
difficult. On the other hand, if agents can specialise in monitoring a narrow set of transactions,
information need not deteriorate as assumed. This form of constant returns to scale monitor-
ing seems, however, a better characterisation of a nation state or modern bureacracy than of
relatively informal groups. Dixit (2003a) considers a costly monitoring structure with more of
this flavour, while Dixit (2003b) considers, in a slightly different setting, profit-maximizing in-
termediaries. While leaving the exact micro-foundations of the current assumption outside the
present model, it therefore seems the most appropriate assumption when considering groups.
1.2.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is perfect public equilibrium (Fudenberg et.al., 1994).15 restrict
attention to perfect public equilibria in which groups attain privately optimal expected payoffs
for their members, conditional on group structure and grim punishment strategies for group
15 The equilibrium is not simply sub-game perfect because actions are conditioned, not on the trading partner's
past actions, but on a public signal of their past actions.
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members caught cheating. Agents face a choice of strategies over which group to join, if any,
and, in all subsequent phases, what action to play in the stage game, conditional on distance
and information about their trading partner. Therefore, agent j's strategy space is defined
over
j = Orj (j) x U {{Fj: (Vg (Gn, Rj), Vm) C Qo} x {aj: (x, D, Rj, R_j) E Q1}} (1.1)
N
Consider the three terms in the strategy space in turn. First, o'j (j) is a mixed strategy profile
for agent j over each location in N, the set of possible groups. After the agent's group, n E N,
is known, each period the agent has two more sets of choices. First, Fj C {h, o} is agent j's
choice of search strategy. If the agent plays h, they seek their "home", the group to which they
belong. If the agent plays o, they seek the outside, that is, the market. The agent's choice is
conditioned on their information set at the start of the period, Q0 . This includes the expected
payoff of finding the group, n, to which agent j belongs, Vg (Gn, Rj), and the expected payoff to
the market, Vm. The payoff to finding the group is a function of the size of the group, Gn, and
whether the agent has previously been caught cheating, Rj. The expected payoff of the market
is also a function of its size, although for simplicity I suppress this in the notation. Finally,
a E {[0, A], C} is agent j's action profile in the subgame conditional on their information set
before playing. This contains x, the distance of the match, and their location, D C n, m}. If
D n, the agent also has information on any past record of cheating by themselves (trivially)
and by their partner, Rj and Rj.
Agents choose their group membership strategies according to a Nash concept, by cal-
culating expected pay-offs conditional on the strategies of other agents. Group formation is
non-cooperative, so the group is unable to exclude prospective members.1 6
To simplify the discussion, I solve for equilibrium recursively by first describing payoffs to
groups as a function of optimal equilibrium strategies, and then consider the variety of possible
16 This accords with many descriptions of ethnicity, which focus on self-identification. In his study of the
Lue people of Thailand, for instance, Moerman writes that "someone is Lue by virtue of believing and calling
himself Lue and acting in ways that validate his Lueness." (quoted in Eltringham (2004), 183). Nevertheless, an
interesting alternative approach to ethnicity would emphasise the need for acceptance by other group members.
Some discussion of this theme can be found in Migdal (ed) (2004). An economic model taking this approach might
use an equilibrium concept such as Bernheim, Peleg and Winston's (1987) Coalition Proof Nash equilibrium.
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group structures in equilibrium. The latter discussion involves several complications that follow
from considering a continuum of agents and a discontinuity in group payoffs.
Sub-Game Strategies
Each period, an agent makes a choice Fj, whether to seek the group, and a choice aj, conditional
on the outcome of their first decision and the process of random matching, of strategy in the
subgame. Groups only exist if an agent who has not cheated in the past prefers to find the group
rather than the market. Moreover, the grim punishment strategy and the coordination game
together ensure that agents who have been caught cheating must prefer the market. Hence, if
groups exist it must be true that
Fj (Rj)= { h if Rj = 0
o if Rj = 
In the market, there is no punishment for not playing trust, so for given expectations of other
players' strategies,
ajm A
where ajm is j's choice of action in the market (that is, given location D = m).
In the group, I assert (for now) that the optimal choice of strategy is to play:
C if R_j = and x < GT
ajn (xlR = O) = A if R_j = and x >GT
0 if R_j = 1
So long as an agent's trading partner has not been reported cheating in the past, an agent,
when located in the group, plays Trust in all trades that are not too distant, and the maximum
attainable value of Trade in all other transactions. If the trading partner has been reported
cheating in the past, then agent j pursues a grim punishment strategy. This choice of actions
derives from an incentive compatibility constraint, which is considered in the next section.
Finally, it is necessary for completeness to specify an agent's choice of actions within the
group conditional on their having been caught cheating in the past. Note that this will not
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actually occur in equilibrium. However, given that the agent knows that the grim punishment
strategy is being pursued in the group, their best response is to play
ajn = 0 if Rj = 1.
1.2.3 Optimal Group Size
Incentive Compatibility
Suppose that; all agents expect all other agents to form groups and search for them in equi-
librium. Then the size of the market is (1- p) L. All transactions in the market, being
anonymous, will involve the agents playing A, which for now is exogenous. I have argued that,
in equilibrium, relatively nearby transactions within the group will involve both players playing
Trust. Transactions at greater distance will be unable to sustain trust, so assume that the
group can coordinate on the greatest possible value of trade, A, which is clearly optimal.
Associated with these strategies are a set of expected values that define the expected value
of transactions associated with being a member of a group of size G, with extent of trust GT.
The first two of these, equations 1.2 and 1.4 , are the expected value of trades in a particular
location, conditional on finding that location, and mirror those in equation 1.1. The first,
VYg (GIRj = 0) is the expected value of trades within the group, n, to which agent j belongs,
assuming they have not been caught cheating in the past. For simplicity, I will denote this as
simply Vg (G), omitting the condition on the report unless otherwise specified. The second,
V;r, is the expected value of trade in the market. Finally, Vh is the expected value of being a
group member in good standing who seeks trades within the group. That is, it is the expected
value of playing h in the search phase.
GT e,-x G ' ee-ax
Vg (G) = 2 fG Te 2dx + 2 Ae 2 dx (1.2)Jo 2 JGT
= AT (1-e(6 -)GT) + AA (e(G-a)GT _ (0-a)G (1.3)
X (1-p)L O ae-a 1)XVm = 2j Ae 2 dx (1.4)
- AA (1 _ e(O-a)(1-p)L) (1.5)
Vh pV (G) + -(1 -p) m (1.6)
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Note that A = a' is a constant that parameterises net returns to scale. It is increasing in 0
and decreasing in a. The mass of the group is normalised to 2G/p, so that each period the
group is of size G. Naturally, no group forms if the returns to scale lost by forming a group
exceed the gains from trusting relationships. Therefore, groups only form if in equilibrium
T (I + A (e(0a-)GT - e(Oe)G) > A (- e(a)( P)L) (1.7)
The group would like to expand as much as possible, to capture any possible increasing
returns to scale. However, the group needs to overcome the incentive compatibility problem in
the prisoner's dilemma if it wants to guarantee that players continue to play trust. The group
is able to sustain trust among at least some of its members by the threat of future punishment
of members who do not comply. For sufficiently distant trades, however, the temptation to
cheat becomes so great that the group is unable to sustain trust. The point at which the
incentive compatibility constraint binds therefore defines the limits of trust, GT. The incentive
compatibility constraint for a group of size G is
TeOGT + a1 h > T OeOGT +6 (me3GV + (1-meDG) Vh)
Vh - Vm > (T + -T)eG+OGT
or
AT (I - e(0-)GT) + AA (e(0-a)GT e(0-)G) > AA (1 - e(9 o)(1-P)L) + CeG+OGT (1.8)
where c = (1-6)(Tp-) and of course G > GT. The left hand side of this equation defines the
benefits of group membership as group size expands. It is concave in both GT and G, and
approaches a maximum of T, reflecting the bounded returns to scale in expectation. The right
hand side defines the temptation to cheat on a trade at distance GT as the group gets larger.
It is convex in both GT and G, reflecting the strongly increasing returns to scale of distant
interactions.
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Optimality and the Extent of Trust
The incentive compatibility constraint can be used to find the optimal group size for a given
market. This problem is equivalent to allowing coalitions to form in the pre-play phase, subject
to the expectation that all other agents also join groups. Because of this expectation, the size
of the group does not affect the size of the market. Hence, the group need only be concerned
with maximizing the payoff to within-group interactions.
The program is
maxAT (1_ e(O-)GT) + AA (e(O-a)GT -e(O-) G
G,GT
(1.9)
s.t.
AT (1- e( )GT) + AA (e( - ' )GT -e( - )G) > AA (1- e(°- )(1- p)L) + ce 3G+OGT (1.10)
G > GT (1.11)
This problem yields the following first order conditions (in addition to the constraints):
a (T -A) e(0 )GT (1 + IL) - cOe/G*OGtI - 2 - 0
(A(°-o)G* (1 + I) -c 3 G*OG l 2 = 0
(1.12)
(1.13)
where /,l is the multiplier on the IC constraint, and 2 is the multiplier on the feasibility
constraint. The problem can be solved for two distinct sets of parameter values.
Case 1: Semi-Trust Groups.
Assume that the feasibility constraint is slack, so /A2 = 0. Rearranging the first-order
conditions, equations 1.12 and 1.13, yields the solution
G* = G + I- ln( A)a - OT-AJ (1.14)
which is the solution so long as
OA > (T-A). (1.15)
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The left-hand side of equation 1.15 represents the marginal return to the group of adding an
additional member whose most distant trade cannot be trusted (and for whom the payoff is
therefore proportional to A). The right-hand side represents the cost of adding a marginal
group member, which is that the marginal Trust interaction now cannot be sustained, and
inolves payoffs of A instead. Optimal additions to the group are finite (from equation 1.14)
since both a - > 0 and > 0. Beyond the margin, additional group members yield lower
expected returns as a result of imperfect matching (the a - 0 term), while continuing to cost
additional Trust trades (the/3 term).
This solution for G yields an implicit solution for G, which is the value of GT that solves
(from equation 1.10) the equation
[T-A(i-e(O-)(1-P)L)]e(O)G [TA(1 TA) = c (K A ) e(3o+0)G
The left-hand side of this equation is concave in GT, while the right-hand side is convex in GT,
so the solution is unique so long as the left-hand side is greater than zero for GT = 0.17 The
second order conditions confirm that the solution to the problem is indeed the maximum.
Case 2: Full Trust Groups.
If the feasibility constraint binds, GT = G, so the problem is simply
maxAT (1- e( - )G) (1.16)
G
s.t. XT ( 1- e(0- )G) > )AA (1- e(0- a)(1- p)L) + ce(3+)G (1.17)
which is maximized at the greatest solution (if one exists) of the IC constraint. This leads to
the first proposition of the paper.
Proposition 1 In a population of size L, if an optimal group exists, then:
17This condition need not be true. In that case, there are either no solutions (and no groups) or two solutions,
in which case the greatest value of G, is relevant.
28
1. if T > 1, an optimal group is of size G* where G* is equal to
G* = GT + In- A)T az- T-A
G is the greatest value of GT for which the inequality
T-e(0-)GT [T-A 3 T-_ A(1-e(-a)(lP)L)+ (0 A ) (+0)GTfiT-A / A__-e ~ ~~~~~~ -  1 - e ( O) 1 - p ) L _ - e0 A A- T - A
holds. In these groups, each agent plays aj = T if x < G* and aj A otherwise.
2. if TA < 1, an optimal group is of size G* where G* is the greatest value of G for which
the inequality
AT ( 1- e( - )G) > AA (1- e(O- a)(1- p)L) + ce(8+ )G
holds. In these groups, each agent plays aj T Vx < G*.
The distinction between full-trust groups and semi-trust groups, and the central role of in-
formational crowding out, highlights why, compared with a constant returns matching function,
the matching function as specified, with its limited increasing returns, is actually disadvanta-
geous for finite group formation. If instead all agents were guaranteed to meet someone each
period, there would be a direct congestion externality in addition to the information externality
modelled here. That is, adding an extra (non-trust) member of the group would reduce the
probability of meeting a trust member of the group. For certain functional forms, this force
could in itself be strong enough to motivate the formation of groups of finite size, even without
informational crowding out.
Since none of the substantive results depend on whether optimal groups are full-trust or
semi-trust groups, for convenience in presenting further results, I make the following assumption.
Assumption Al: Assume that A < 1, so that optimal groups are full-trust groups.Assumption~~~ AI suetaT-A --
The results from proposition one yield an implicit function for G*, the value of GT (and G)
at which the incentive compatibility constraint exactly binds. G* is implicitly determined as
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the greatest solution (if one exists) to the implicit funtion, F (G*):
F(G(z); z) = AT ( 1- -A(i-e(1 _ e(-a)(1- p)L) - ce(+O)G = 0
where z = {cf,,L, ,m,p,T+,T,A}
Using the implicit function theorem, I can investigate the properties of G* with respect to the
vector of parameters, z. The partial derivative of F (.) with respect to G is
FG = cTe( °- )G - (/3 + 9) ce(O+O)G.
It is straightforward to show that F(G(x); x) is a concave function with a maximum at
a= + / + 0 l - T+ - T p .
If a group exists, F(G) > 0 and G* > G, with the second inequality holding strictly if and only
if the first inequality holds strictly. Since is the maximum of a strictly concave function and
G* > G, it follows that FG* < 0.
The incentive compatibility constraint is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The positive part of
F (G) is the Group Return, the expected value of a group of size G. The negative part is the
Cheat Return, the sum of the expected value of the market and the appropriately discounted
value of cheating in a match at distance G. Group size is determined by the upper intersection
of the two curves. A group equilibrium need not exist: this is the situation depicted in CR'.
The fact that the Cheat Return intersects the Group Return from below illustrates intuitively
why FG* < 0: F (G) is intuitively the difference between the return to trusting and the return
to cheating, which is zero (and falling) at G*.
Using this result, the comparative statics for optimal group size (and the extent of trust)
are summarised in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 The most distant trade over which the group can maintain trust, GT, is in-
creasing in the discount factor, 6, the effectiveness of monitoring, m, the effectiveness of group
search, p, and the return to trust, T. It is decreasing in the attractiveness of cheating, T+,
the productivity of outside opportunity, A, the size of the total population, L, and the rate of
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CR'
Cheat Return
Group Return
G*w~ G
Figure 1-2: Incentive Compatibility and Group Size
decline of information, 3. For sufficiently large groups, GT is increasing in localization, c,
and decreasing in returns to scale, 0.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from differentiating F (G). 
1.2.4 Equilibrium Group Formation
The equilibrium formation concept for groups is Nash. In a pre-play phase, each individual
makes their decision to join a group, taking as given the decisions of all other individuals.
Therefore, all groups will be symmetric (since otherwise some agents would join a different
group) and all agents will be indifferent between joining their group and joining any other
group.
A particular problem arises because, when there is a continuum of agents, any move by a
single agent is infinitesimally small, and hence has no effect on overall group payoffs. Accord-
ingly, without further refinement, any symmetric distribution of agents into groups is a possible
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equilibrium. I therefore consider moves only by small but measurable sets of agents, and take
the limit of this process as the measure of the set shrinks towards zero. Similar problems
are dealt with in Dubey and Shapley (1994) and Peters (1991). A related problem is that,
if the population is segmented into very small groups, agents will choose to seek the market,
and hence, if they can perfectly avoid their groups, their expected payoff is locally invariant to
group size. An e probability of mistakenly finding the group resolves this issue, since it breaks
the indifference of agents to the size of their group.
Consider a partition of the population into J subsets {Si1, ..., SJ}, each having equal measure,
L. Each Sj has a strategic choice over group location, in that it can choose among the set of
locations, N. Any allocation of subsets to groups is an equilibrium if no subset can change
groups and attain higher expected utility from the alternative group. Clearly, this implies that
in equilibrium, all groups must provide equal expected utility.
The expected utility of a group is a continuous function of group size with a unique maxi-
mum, so long as the group is large enough so that its members seek it rather than the market.
The per-period utility from joining group n is therefore
(1 -e) Vm + EVg (Gn) if Gn < Gmin
(1-p) Vm+pVg(Gn) ifGn > Gmin
where Gmin is the minimum group size such that agents seek the group, given the size of the
market. If a group equilibrium exists, Gmin < G*, so V' (G) > 0 V G < Gmin. In order to rule
out potential co-ordination problems over group location, assume that each potential location
is ordered, so that, for example, if equilibrium involves groups, these are formed in the first
i potential locations. Furthermore, restrict attention to symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria,
so that, when there are A groups in equilibrium, each Sj sets
1j (l0 = if i < 
= Oifi>h
Given the actions of all other agents, the relevant component of the payoff is effectively simply
the expected value of group membership. Since the expected value of group membership is
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continuous in group size, a symmetric Nash equilibrium satisfies the following properties:
Definition 3 In a group Nash equilibrium:
1. each subset of the population, Sj, plays a mixed strategy profile in the pre-play phase,
(I~) = 1ioIorj (1 -Vi < i
= OVi> 
Each group has the same size, = pL, and payoff, Vg(G).
2. All agents seek their group in the play phase, playing Fj = n. The size of the market is
(1 -p)L.
3. Vg (G) > Vg  + Sj)Vj E J.
The first property is simply a convenient way to sort agents into n symmetric groups without
relying too much on co-ordination amongst the agents. Any arbitrary set of pure or mixed
strategies that resulted in symmetric groups would also be an equilibrium. The second property
establishes that by definition a group equilibrium involves active groups. This distinguishes
the concept from the alternative equilibrium of the game, in which agents seek the market each
period. The final property requires that each of the subsets of players, Sj, operating as a single
agent, at least weakly prefers the group in which they find themselves to any other group. The
following definition extends the concept of Nash equilibrium to a continuum of agents.
Lemma 1 With a continuum of agents, a Nash equilibrium requires that Vg (G) < O.
Proof. The second property of the Nash equilibrium requires that Vg(G) > Vg(G + Sj).
Therefore, for any measurable Sj,
Vs ( + ) - (g) < .
Si
Now take the limit as J - oo, so that Sj - 0, and apply the definition of a derivative:
lim (G + S) V g(G) V(G)< O.
Sj -0 Si
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.The lemma formalises the intuition that in equilibrium, the value associated with a group
cannot be increasing in group membership, since if it were, for some sufficiently fine partition
of the population, some Sj would find it in their interest to move to the smaller group.
Lemma 2 Any Nash equilibrium can have at most n* groups, where n* is the integer for which
it is true that n* (G*/p) < L < (n* + 1) (G*/p).
Proof. Consider a candidate equilibrium with k > n* groups. Each group has size Gk = L
Then Gk < G*. But Vg (G) is a strictly convex function that attains a maximum at G*. Hence,
Vg (Gk) > O. But equilibrium requires V, (G) < O. Hence, the candidate equilibrium cannot be
an equilibrium. a
Although the equilibrium concept ensures there cannot be too many groups in equilibrium,
it does not rule out the possibility that fewer than n* groups may form, since this would require
coordination amongst a larger coalition of players. The following lemma proves that the optimal
group Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium involving n* groups.
Lemma 3 The optimal group Nash equilibrium contains n* groups.
Proof. For a given market size, the optimal group size is G*, with total membership G*/p.
From Definition 1, V (G) < OVG > G*. With k' < n* groups, group size is -L-, of value
Vg (p). It follows immediately that Vg (G) is maximized at the minimum feasible value of G,
G = - > G*. Therefore, the optimal group Nash equilibrium involves the maximum feasible
number of groups, n*. 
The preceding lemma establishes that the optimal group Nash equilibrium will involve
groups slightly larger than G*, where G* is the optimal size of a group given market size. This
makes it difficult to establish comparative statics for changes in parameters in general. A small
change in a parameter, for example, may move actual group size much closer to optimal group
size than before. In comparing welfare, therefore, I abstract from this problem, and compare
group outcomes at G*.18
18 This approach is also often used in the club goods literature (see Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) for references).
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1.3 Defensive Group Strategies
Proposition 2 established that sustainable group size falls in response to improvements in the
outside opportunity, A, which has so far been exogenous. However, smaller groups come with
the cost of fewer gains from increasing returns to scale. It is therefore possible for group
members to be worse off as a result of improvements in the productivity of trade interactions.
This result is established in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the value of trade is exogenous and equal to A, improvements in A can reduce
the welfare of group members.
Proof. The expected return to group membership each period is
V (t) = pV (g) + (1-p) V (a)
= pT ( 1-e(--)G) + (1 - p) A ( 1-e(O - a)(1- p)L)
Accordingly, the change in value as a result of an exogenous change in A is
dV (t) T0 (1 - e(o -)G) dG ()Ta1--W ( 1 e(°- ce) ( - l )dA + ( dA - p) 
By the implicit function theorem,
dG FA - (1 - e(0- a)(1- )L)
dA FG c ( + 0) e(1+O)G - ( - 0) Te(-) G <0
Substituting through and solving yields
dV1 ( Tc \
dA < X G* < I In T . 3 m)jA- a~ + /3 T+ - T - p - + r
Note that the right hand side is approximately equal to G + . Aa+/0 [
Recall that, at the start of each round, each group can announce the value of trade that its
members will play, si. If all groups are symmetric, then this is the value of trade. If there is a
disagreement among the groups of which players are members (or if one player is not a member
of an active group), then assume for convenience that each player plays min {s1, s2} where si
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is the preannounced strategy, if any, and A otherwise.
It is important to remember that the reason for reducing the value of trade is to reduce the
outside option of group members. If, for example, ostracised group members could be perfectly
recognised by non-group members willing to play A, there would be no reason for groups to
reduce the value of trade. Inter-group hostility, in this interpretation, is designed to increase
loyalty to one's own group: reduced payoffs to other groups are merely a by-product.
Allowing the group to choose A yields the following program for an optimal group:
maxL = A [T (1 -e(,9-)G) + (1 -p) A (1 - e(0Q)(1p)L)] (1.18)
G,A
+bt (AT (I - e( -)G) A A (- e(O-)(1-p)L) ce(3+0)G) (1.19)
+A (- A) (1.20)
+. 3A (1.21)
Assuming an interior solution for A, then from the first order conditions Ayi = 1-p. Accordingly,
for interior solutions, the value of relaxing the IC constraint is proportional to how often group
members find the market. The optimal size of the group is
G**= ln T + T 1 p 1 -+ m (1.22)a +3 \T - T 1- pI- 3+O}
In = (1.23)
a +
while the optimal value of trade is
T F z a a -___ _
A** 1-e(-a)(1-P)L 1 +/ + (/ + 0) (_p)) (1.24)
1- -- e( - ±)(1-p))L e 1  ] (1.25)e(O-a)(1-p)L~~ + P + 0) (  - A
This approach yields the following analytic comparative statics.
Proposition 5 When the value of outside trade can be limited, G** is increasing in T,p, 6
and m. It is decreasing in /3, 0 and T+. It is decreasing in if ln > + and increasing
otherwise. Population size, L, has no effect on optimal group size. A** is increasing in 6,m
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and T. It is decreasing in T + and L.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from differentiating equations 1.22 and .24. 
These comparative statics are relatively straightforward except that, as before, group size
increases in c only for sufficiently large groups.19 Note that, when the group can choose the
value of trade, population size no longer affects optimal group size, but it does raise optimal
hostility. This is another channel whereby modernization (here in the form of a population
expansion) can increase ethnic hostility.
Further results with respect to the optimal value of trade are more difficult to sign. The
reason for this can be found in equation 1.25 . Rearranging the equation slightly,
A** ( 1-e(0 - )(1- p )L) = T {1-e(O-)G* [ + Y]} (1.26)
where Y - -o - The left hand side is the expected value of market transactions, the right
-(/8+o)(1-p)'
hand side the expected value of group transactions, up to an adjustment factor, + Y. Larger
values of Y reduce the optimal value of trade, other things being equal. Y is the product of 1
and -. Both these terms can be interpreted in terms of the opportunity cost of hostility to
the market. The first is larger when the group is more segregated, reflecting the lower cost of
hostility in this case. The second term increases when localization increases or returns to scale
fall. It also increases when information dissipates less quickly, reflecting the smaller marginal
cost to the group of expanding trust.
While analytic expressions for the comparative statics with respect to a, /3, 0 and p can be
derived, it is difficult to sign them, because each parameter has several offsetting effects. In
addition to the direct effect on the optimal value of trade through Y, there is a further effect
through optimal group size, and still a further effect through the size of the market.
'
9This condition seems likely to be met. Assuming conservatively that p = .9, = .9, f = .9 and T+ = 2T,
and rearranging, the condition requires
In (-) > -ln~ +ln(fi+ 0).
e a
By assumption, 0 < c. Therefore, replacing with a and noting that n (1 + X) < X for X > 0, the condition
is guaranteed if
- < -In -) 1.65.
This imply states that information must not decline too rapidly relative to meeting probabilities.
This simply states that information must not decline too rapidly relative to meeting probabilities.
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The most helpful approach turns out to be to assume that parameters are such that A** = 0,
and then consider the effect of small changes in the parameters on the sign of A**. Note that
A** > 0 X 1 - e( - a )G** [1 + Y] > 0
For Y sufficiently small, this approximately implies
G** > I(1-p) ( + )
Taking the derivative of both sides shows that (locally), A** is unambiguously decreasing in p
and 0. It is increasing in a so long as G** is sufficiently large, that is, so long as G** itself is
increasing in localization. Finally the effect of / depends on the parameters as follows:
dA** 1 ( 1 ) 1d-<0= G**+>d,3 +/ 3+j (1- p) (/ + 0)2 '
Most of these results are intuitively appealing. As p increases, for example, reducing
the value of trade becomes less costly but remains effective in expanding the range of trust.
This strongly supports an interpretation of ethnic group conflict that emphasizes the effect of
colonial policies that divided subject populations, whether into Hindus and Muslims in India,
or Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Similarly, a higher value of 0 raises the value to the group of
expanding. Finally, when matches are more localized ( high), high value but distant trades
contribute relatively less to utility, and hence reducing the value of trade is less worthwhile.
1.4 Social Welfare
This section considers the circumstances under which it is optimal for groups to form, and the
circumstances under which it is possible for groups to form even if they are not socially optimal.
For convenience, it is assumed that the optimal group Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium of
interest, and that the population can be partitioned into precisely optimal groups.
Consider first groups that take the value of outside trade as exogenous. Given that an
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agent expects everyone else to join a group, they also do so if
T (I -e(0--)G ) > A (1 - e(0-)(1-p)L) (1.27)
That is, the agent joins the group so long as it provides greater expected utility than the market,
given that the market is of size (1 - p) L. The condition for social optimality, however, is that
pT (I - e(±)G) + (1 - p) A (I - e(0-a)(1-p)L) > A (I - e(0-a)L)
which can be rearranged as
_ 1-e (O- °- ) G* ) A -e(°-a) (1-p)L)-A-T (1-e ) ) > A ( -e(0 )(1P)L) [e(0)(1p)L - e(09-)L]. (1.28)
Taken together, equations 1.27 and 1.28 show that there is a wedge between the private and
social conditions for group membership, equal to
A [e(0)(1-p)L _ e(O-)L]
Graphically, Figure 1.3 shows how the social optimum varies depending on the degree of segre-
gation of the groups. For values of p < p*, the value of the group is undefined, since no agents
actually go to the group, and of course the group would be unable to sustain trust even if they
did. At p*, a full-trust group can be sustained. Once the group becomes privately optimal, its
value increases, because it is able to sustain trust among its members. The value of the group
can be convex over some ranges of p, since an increase in p not merely increases the value of
a group of given size, but also increases the potential size of the group. If groups are suffi-
ciently segregated, so that p > p**, the group equilibrium dominates the market equilibrium.
Note that the expected value of group transactions must strictly exceed the expected value of
the market equilibrium in order for the group equilibrium to be optimal, since total welfare
includes both group and (small) market transactions. For intermediate values of p such that
p* < p < p**, the optimal group equilibrium is dominated by the market equilibrium.
Attempts to encourage integration by different groups therefore have an ambiguous effect on
social welfare. If the different groups are already somewhat integrated, they may be suboptimal,
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VVVm(L)
Vm((1 -p)L)
p* p** 1 p
Figure 1-3: Social and Private Efficiency of Groups
and forcing p to fall may increase social welfare, although for this, p must fall below p*. If,
on the other hand, groups are quite distinct, attempts to force integration are likely to prove
counter-productive.
Consider now groups that can also set the value of trade optimally, and assume an interior
solution. In this case, it is straightforward to use the envelope theorem to examine changes in
welfare. These can be compared with changes in welfare for a population of identical size that
is in the market equilibrium.
Some parameters, of course, affect only the group equilibrium. Increases in p and falls
in /3 raise welfare in the optimal group equilibrium without affecting the market equilibrium.
Increases in 0 and reductions in ca, however, disproportionately favor populations that are in
the market equilibrium. This result is proved with respect to 0 in the following proposition.
The result with respect to a can be proved similarly.
Proposition 6 The elasticity of income in location D with respect to an increase in returns to
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scale, , is denoted EVD,o. It is greater (1) for a population in the market equilibrium than for
the same population in a group equilibrium and (2) for a population in a market equilibrium
than for an optimal group of the same size.
Proof. The elasticity of value in a location of size P with equilibrium payoffs proportional
to r with respect to a change in 0 is
VD dVD (P) 0 0 1 - e(0- O) P (1 + (a - 0) P) (1.29)
dOf VD(P) a - 1 -e(O-) P
Taking the derivative with respect to P yields
d vD, o Oe(° - a) P (0-0)pdPo (1 -~ e()P+ (a - 9) P - 1 > 0.
Note that the elasticity is a function of population size but not equilibrium payoffs. Accordingly,
the elasticity of value in the market equilibrium is simply evo (L). The elasticity of value in the
group equilibrium is a convex combination of the elasticity of value in the group, evg,O (G) and
in the small market, EVm,O ((1 - p) L). Group size falls when 0 increases, so cv g ,o (G) overstates
the true elasticity of returns to the group. Since both G and (1 - p) L are smaller than L, both
Evg,o (G) and Evm,o ((1 - p) L) are less than EVm,o (L).
Consider now the elasticity of value for a group of optimal size that chooses hostility opti-
mrally. Applying the envelope theorem yields:
9 1 - e(0-a)G* (1 ( - 0) G*) - c(I-p) e(+O)G* (a - ) G*
EV~, = (1.30)
a - 01 - e(O-)G * - c(-P)e(3+0)G*TAe
Comparing equations 1.29 and 1.30 yields, after considerable simplification, that
VD,O (P) > v,o (P) * e( ) > 1 - (a - ) P
which is true for all values of P. 
This result provides one interpretation of Easterly and Levine's (1997) African growth
tragedy: economies in which groups are important gain less from modern technologies that
increase returns to scale than those in which the population is united. This is both because
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of a pure fragmentation effect, reflecting returns to scale, and because some of the returns to
scale are lost by the need for increased inter-group hostility.
1.5 Non-Stationarity and Shocks
Within the stationary model, multiple equilibria are possible, and even the best group outcome
may be inferior to the market equilibrium. Is it possible to say anything about a non-stationary
model, for example when there is a shock to the value of some parameters?
Recall that the population is replaced at rate o, so that each period JoL new agents arrive
in the population and face a choice of group. Suppose that the number of optimal groups has
increased as a result of, say, a one-time unanticipated increase in 0. It is in the social interest to
reduce the size of each group and increase the number of groups. But each existing member of
the population is already in their group and it is infinitely costly to switch groups. Therefore,
a new group will form only if it is in the private interest of new members of the population.
To consider new group formation in this context, agents require a rule for when they will
form a new group, since otherwise any arbitrary beliefs might support some kind of group
formation. A natural rule to consider is to allow incoming agents to form a new group if,
assuming all other incoming agents make the same calculation, it is privately worthwhile to
form a new group. Assume for convenience that the flow of agents is large enough so that,
if all entering agents form a new group, they prefer to find the group rather than the market.
This assumption keeps the size of the market constant throughout any transition.
If the flow of the population is large enough, so that 60L > G*, an entering cohort can form
a group immediately. If, however, the population flow is small, then the population may be
stuck with too few groups for some time, or even indefinitely. New members of the population
form a new group only if the returns to doing so in the transition exceed the returns to joining
an existing, inefficiently large group. Eventually, the new group will grow until it reaches the
same size as the old groups. Note that this will be exact, since otherwise new agents would
reallocate themselves between groups. Denoting the new group as G- (since it is smaller than
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optimal) and the old group as G+ , the new group forms if
T T
E t V (G-) > E tVg (G+),
t=O t=O
where T is the period in which G- and G+ attain the same size. Although a complete
characterization of these dynamics is difficult, intuitively new groups will tend to form only
when the inefficiencies of the old groups have become large. Moreover, the larger the optimal
group size relative to the rate of population flow, the more difficult it will be to start new
groups. It follows that greater segregation of groups, which raises optimal group size, also
makes it more difficult to form new groups if it becomes socially optimal to do so.
The following lemma is useful in discussing non-stationarity.
Lemma 4 The social return to joining a group smaller than the optimum exceeds the private
return.
Proof. Consider a static choice of groups for a small but measurable quantity of agents,
Sj. Suppose that there is at least one group of less than optimal size, G-, and one of greater
than optimal size, G+. When all agents are group members, the size of the market is fixed at
(1- p) L. If there are no further changes in group structure, agents join the small group if
Vg (G- + Sj) - Vg (G+ + Sj) > 0.
Taking the limit as Sj -* 0, agents join the small group if
Vg (G-) - Vg (G+) > 0 (1.31)
The utilitarian social criterion, however, is
(G- + Sj) V (- + j) + G+V ( +) > -V (-) + (G+ + Sj) Vg (G+ + Sj)
V (G-+Sj)-Vg (G++Sj) > G+ [Vg(G+S)- Vg(G+)]
-G- [V (G +Sj) - Vg(G-)
Sj
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Again, taking the limit as Sj -- 0,
Vg (G-) - Vg (G+) > G+Vg (G +) -G-Vg (G-). (1.32)
Since by construction, Vg (G+) < 0 and Vg (G-) > 0, the right-hand side is strictly negative,
and therefore, comparing equation 1.32 with equation 1.31, agents are too reluctant to join the
small group. 
The following result shows that persistence of overly large groups has important negative
consequences for welfare. In particular, it raises the degree of hostility that each group optimally
pursues.
Proposition 7 Increases in group size above the optimal group size, G**, reduce the constrained
optimal value of trade, At.
Proof. For given group size, the group solves the following program:
max AP {T (1 -e(0-)GT) + A (e(0-a)GT - e(0-)G) } + A (1 -p) A(
GT,A
s.t. A T (I- e(0-)GT) + A (e(00-)GT- e(0-a)G)] > AA, + ce 3G±OGT
A > A
where = 1 -e( 0-a)( 1- p)L
Assuming the second constraint is slack, the first order conditions yield the usual result that
the Lagrange multiplier =1 - p and substituting through yields
Gt 1In((T-)_ o /_G
-T - n(I j ) a
At = ( [T (I- + A (e(o)GT -A - CeIG+9GT]
Take the total derivative,
dAt OAt OAt dGT
dG OG GOCT dG
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These terms are:
DAt !|(a -) e(-)G _ e ± 1DC A1
At [(T A) (a -0) e(O-)GT _ Ae fi G+OGT
DCT A e
dGt
dG a
This yields the result that d-t < 0 ifdG
cAe( -)G <3eOGT [(T - A) e - aGT - c eG] (1.33)
Now, taking the derivative of V (G) the same way (still treating total group size as given) yields
the result that V (G) < 0 if
aAe(°)G < /eGT [(T - A) e- (1-p) eG] (1.34)
Comparing the right hand-size of equations 1.33 and 1.34, it is clear that a group being larger
than the optimum size is a sufficient condition for it to choose to reduce the value of trade below
the value it would have chosen at the optimum. 
Hence, for a fixed number of groups, the externality to creating a new group implies not
merely that new groups form inefficiently slowly, but also that existing groups become increas-
ingly hostile to each other until and unless a new group eventually forms.
1.6 Discussion: France and Rwanda
This paper has suggested that understanding the endogeneity of fractionalization can yield novel
insights into both the welfare implications of groups and the sources of inter-group hostility. It
has also proposed a model in which hostility arises between groups in certain situations, not as
a result of competition for resources or power but as a way of strengthening the group itself.
This section considers the development experience of two countries, France and Rwanda, during
the late 19th century and early 20th century, in some detail, to illustrate the mechanisms at
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work in the model. The reason for considering these two very different countries is that they
represent relatively clear cases of the disappearance of ethnic groups (France) and their creation
(Rwanda).
A final section considers several more disparate strands of literature and their implications
for the model.
1.6.1 France, 1870-1914
Today, by most measures, France is both highly homogeneous and economically very successful.
According to Alesina et.al.'s (2003) data, France has among the world's lowest rates of ethnic
and linguistic fractionalization, and also a relatively low rate of religious fractionalization.
This accords with most people's conception of France as a united nation with a strong sense
of national identity, particularly proud of its culture and especially its language. But this
apparent modern unity is in fact largely the product of a brief spurt of nation-building during
the Third Republic (that is, between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the start of the
First World War).
Linguistically, France was highly diverse even late in the 19th Century. According to Eugen
Weber (1976) (on whose book, Peasants into Frenchmen, most of this account is based), for
"almost half the children who would reach adulthood in the last quarter of the [nineteenth]
century" French was "a foreign language" (p67). In 1835, French was spoken by only the
north-west corner of the country, its western border marked by Brittany, its eastern extremity
little past Paris, and its southern border scarcely extending to Bourges. In other regions, French
was supplanted by a variety of other languages: Catalan, German, Flemish, Breton, Basque,
langue d'Oc, and other, now forgotten, varieties of patois. These were not mere dialects: French
was entirely incomprehensible to many speakers of patois.
Fractionalization was not confined to the merely linguistic. Many people outside the valleys
of the Loire and the Seine regarded France as a foreign country, and felt a "deep-seated sense
of difference" from the French (p98). Around the Pyrenees as late as 1907, there is evidence
that the loyalty of most lay with the Basques or with Spain, but not with France. The Breton
forces in the Franco-Prussian War had to be reminded by their leader "I beg you to forget that
you are Bretons, and to remember only that you are French", while a Breton delegation met
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Woodrow Wilson at Versailles to plead for national self-determination.
Weber lists a number of factors that were instrumental in the successful creation of a national
French identity during the Third Republic. At the top of his list is the creation of an extensive
road and rail network, most importantly extending beyond highways to local roads that brought
previously isolated villages into closer contact with the outside world. Weber writes
So, roads and rail lines that were secondary in name but primary in fact brought
the isolated patches of the countryside out of their autarky - cultural as well as
economic - into the market economy and the modern world... The conjunction ...
resulted in a crash program of national integration of unparalleled scope and effec-
tiveness; a program that could operate on this scale only because, for the first time,
economic and technological conditions offered the possibility for radical cultural
change. (206)
The coming of rail and road had the effect both of bringing people from outlying areas
into contact with other French, and of reducing the scope for artisanal handicraft compared to
machines and factories. Thus, they can be thought of as reducing p and increasing 0, as well,
perhaps, as reducing ca, the localization of matches.
Another important factor in the spread of French language and national feeling was the
extension of conscription, which can reasonably be considered a straightforward reduction in
p. Conscription, particularly late in the century when it became almost universal, played an
important role in expanding the use of French, although units, being regionally based, sometimes
persisted with the use of patois. Resistance to the army also died out as conditions for soldiers
improved to the point where they even exceeded the average conditions of rural life in many
areas - an increase in A relative to T that the group was powerless to prevent.
Finally, many commentators have highlighted the importance of universal, compulsory and
free public schooling, in French. Weber emphasises that schools became useful only once the
world had already changed - in terms of the model, once productive parameters such as 0 and ca
had already changed - but it is equally true that, these parameters having changed, the schools
themselves were important instruments of unification.
Thus, the model suggests that the policies of integration pursued in France reduced sus-
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tainable group size until groups were no longer sustainable. While increasing 0 and reducing
a might be expected to lead to inter-group hostility, nation-building policies that reduced p
limited hostility. Why urban French pursued these costly integrationist policies is admittedly
an important question that lies largely outside the scope of the model. One interpretation is
that they had simply already advanced to the stage where they functioned as a market, perhaps
because of greater density of interactions and earlier access to industrialization. In that case,
it was clearly in their interest to expand the scope of the market as much as possible.
1.6.2 Rwanda, 1860 to 1961
Rwanda, it need hardly be pointed out, is a very different country to France along many dimen-
sions. But the contemporary importance of Rwanda's ethnic divide can lead to impressions
of the role of ethnicity in Rwanda that are just as misleading as contemporary impressions
of French ethnicity. The genocide of 1994 was the most recent and dramatic instance of the
conflict between the country's two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. The divide
between these groups also lay at the heart of Rwanda's movement to independence from Bel-
gium in the years 1959-1961. It may, therefore, be surprising to find that the divide between
Hutus and Tutsis is largely a relatively modern creation.
The Hutu and Tutsi divide is highly unusual even in Africa. Many of the usual indicators
of distinct ethnicity are missing. There is no language barrier between Hutus and Tutsis, and
there are only minor linguistic variations in the pre-colonial language, Kinyarwanda, across
regions (Newbury (1988)). Nor are there systematic religious differences between Hutus and
Tutsis. On Ijwi Island in the 1970s, in neighbouring Zaire (as it was then known), Hutus and
Tutsis were typically known not as Hutus or Tutsis, but either by their clan identity or simply
as "Badusi" (a collective term for Rwandans in general, or sometimes for Tutsis in particular).
What, then, distinguishes the Hutu, who comprise over 80 per cent of the population, from
the Tutsi, who comprise most of the remainder? One answer is that the division in some
ways resembles a class division. Before independence, the Tutsi dominated both property and
the apparatus of the state. In traditional usage, being a Tutsi signified possession of wealth
and power almost as much as it signified descent. In her study of the prefecture of Kinyaga,
Newbury (1988) argues that the concept of being a "Hutu" had little political significance until
48
at least the reign of King Rwabugiri from around the 1860s. Successful Hutus often "became"
Tutsis.
After the 1860s, however, the division between Hutus and Tutsis solidified. The early
Europeans in Rwanda constructed elaborate theories of the racial distinctness of Hutus and
Iutsis from each other.20 First the Germans and later the Belgians consciously fostered the
Hutu/Tutsi division, largely to create a cooperative group of local proxies. For example,
the Belgians united in one person what had previously in many cases been the roles of three
overlapping chiefs: whereas at least one of these had previously often been a non-Tutsi, the
new position was almost invariably filled by a Tutsi (Prunier (1995)). Moreover, education
was provided almost exclusively by Catholic missionary schools, that taught only - with rare
exceptions - the favored Tutsis. The development of a Hutu identity arose largely in response
to the increased privileges and rigidification of identity that Tutsis underwent under Rwabugiri
and the colonial powers.
Colonization probably affected all of the parameters of the model. Colonists brought with
them some European productive technologies, thereby increasing 0. However, investment in
infratructure, for instance, was considerably lower than in European countries, so ca may not
have fallen very far. Many of the colonists' policies consciously fostered divisions between the
population, increasing p. Even the reliance on what were perceived to have been traditional
power structures, such as chiefs, reinforced the role of groups, perhaps reducing /3. In France,
by contrast, the central authorities consciously sent outsiders to remote areas to serve as bu-
reaucrats and magistrates. On balance, these forces probably produced three key changes.
First, there was some increase in the potential attractiveness of the market (0 increased), al-
though probably considerably less than in France or other developed nations. Second, other
changes did not systematically push the population towards the market equilibrium. In par-
ticular, increased p and reduced reinforced the ability to form groups. Finally, the potential
for group hostility was greatly increased, through the increases in both p and 0. The model
therefore qualitatively captures some of the main developments in Rwanda that created the
20 Modern authors remain divided on the highly emotive subject of the extent to which the ancestors of modern
Tutsis were a distinct group from the rest of the population, possibly having migrated to Rwanda from another
area in the distant past. For example, Newbury and Destexhe both downplay the significance of any distinct
origins along these lines, while Prunier (p16) cautiously accepts the possibility of distinct origins.
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setting for the extreme ethnic division of more recent times.
1.6.3 Other Evidence
Although Rwanda is in many ways unusual even within Africa in the exact circumstances (not
to mention the intensity) of its conflict, many of the themes of construction of ethnic identity
are similar throughout the rest of Africa. For example, Nigeria is one of the world's most
ethnically heterogeneous nations. From around the 1920s, tribal associations emerged, founded
in cities but with members who came originally from a particular area of the countryside. A
distinguished early scholar of these groups, James Coleman, writing in 1952, saw these as giving
voice to "ethnic groups previously inarticulate". He saw the primary role of these associations
as providing mutual aid and protection, in accelerating acculturation to the cities, and in
assisting development of the villages of their rural origin, rather than engaging in rent-seeking
or competition (Coleman (1994)).21
Moreover, although the Hutu/Tutsi divide is relatively unusual in Africa in the extent to
which it resembles a class or caste divide, the pattern of colonial rulers creating or exacerbating
"ethnic" divides is widespread. Migdal (1988) studies the creation of new groups during the
period of British rule in Sierra Leone in some detail, and cites studies relating to Zimbabwe,
and further afield, the Karen on the Thai/Burmese border. Migdal writes
tribes, linguistic communities, and ethnic groups changed dramatically in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in large part because of the colonialists'
support of certain forms of social organizations. The new tribes maintained a
relationship to the past... [but] the new social fragmentation ... did not depend
entirely on old tribal symbols and ties. (130)
This process of group reformation fits quite neatly with the stylised process of new group
formation described in the non-stationary section of the paper.
21A recent example of rearrangement of ethnicity is Somalia, which until recently appeared to be largely
homogeneous (over 80 per cent Somali). However, following a disastrous war against Ethiopia, from 1976, and
protracted civil strife, it is now rife with separatist movements defined by clan loyalties. (See Alesina et.al.
(2003) and Fafchamps (2004).)
50
More recently, Ted Miguel (2003) has studied the role of ethnic diversity in public goods
provision in neighbouring areas of Kenya and Tanzania. Miguel argues that, whereas ethnic
divisions have played a key role in Kenyan politics, Tanzania has pursued a self-consciously
nation-building strategy since independence. In Kenya, the local degree of ethnic fragmen-
tation is heavily associated with poor local provision of public goods such as schools and well
maintenance, whereas in Tanzania, local ethnic fragmentation appears to have no effect on local
provision of public goods. The most important nation-building strategies cited by Miguel are
linguistic unification and a nationalistic public school curriculum, mirroring the policies that
Weber argues; were effective in France in the late nineteenth century. While such strategies
appear to have been succesful in reducing the effect of fractionalization in Tanzania, Miguel
cautions that they may not be universally appropriate.
This caution raises the broader question of when the appropriate response to ethnic fraction-
alization is nation-building and when it is separation through, for example, self-determination.
This question is particularly pertinent in Africa, with its colonial era boundaries that often
bear little relation to ethnic divisions or even geography.2 2 The model presented here sug-
gests a framework for thinking about this issue in particular cases. When ethnic groups are
already very distinct, redrawing national boundaries to achieve greater separation of groups
may be optimal.2 3 On the other hand, very heterogeneous nations with intermingled ethnic
groups in frequent contact may have a better chance of pursuing nation-building policies suc-
cessfully. Although policies that aim explicitly at nation-building may succeed under the right
circumstances, they carry with them the cost of disrupting existing productive arrangements.
They are more likely to be succesful when accompanied by policies that increase the relative
attractiveness of the market, such as openness to modern technology and investment in suitable
infrastructure.
22See Herbst (2000) for an influential recent discussion of the problem of national borders in Africa.
2 3 Unfortunately, as the example of Rwanda highlights, groups can be effectively quite separate without neces-
sarily being geographically segregated.
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper has adopted a constructivist approach to group formation as a way of gaining under-
standing of inter-group hostility. It has focused in particular on ethnic groups, since previous
research by economists, which has largely treated ethnicity as exogenous, has found they are
associated with poor economic outcomes, often because of inter-ethnic hostility. The model
suggests that ethnicity, and even inter-ethnic hostility, can be an efficient response to economic
parameters. Thus, the empirical association of ethnic diversity with economic underperfor-
mance may suffer from reverse causality.
In the model, both group formation and inter-group hostility are responses to parameters
including returns to scale, efficiency of search, information flows and the ability to separate
effectively from the rest of the population. Hostility, when it arises, need not be the product
of elite manipulation. Instead, it arises as a way of ensuring the group's own viability by
expanding the range of trust within the group.
Although ethnic group formation and hostility can be efficient, they need not be so. Even
if groups arise efficiently, the non-stationary section of the paper shows that it may be difficult
for them to adjust efficiently to new settings. This is likely to be particularly true when
optimal groups are large relative to the population. Inefficiently slow adjustment tends to
produce more hostility than would otherwise occur. Modernization, broadly construed, is
likely to exacerbate these problems, so long as ethnic groups persist. Nation-building policies
such as infrastructure investment or explicitly integrationist policies may ameliorate some of
these problems. However, integrationist policies in particular come with a short-run cost of
disrupting existing ethnic structures. Only if the population is already relatively integrated
can such policies be expected to raise welfare.
This paper has deliberately adopted an extreme version of constructivism, in which every-
one is exactly alike ex ante. Allowing individuals to differ in their ability to join particular
ethnic groups could introduce a host of interesting issues. In particular, not all groups would
be symmetric. Relations between groups of markedly different size, such as the Hutus and Tut-
sis, could then be addressed explicitly, as could the question of why small communities often
dominate particular branches of trade, as for instance South Asians dominate manufacturing
in Kenya.
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More broadly, the model can potentially be applied to many types of groups aside from ethnic
groups. Indeed, once ethnic groups are modeled explicitly it becomes clear that conceptually
they are not entirely distinct from other types of groups, such as religious groups or social
organizations. These could also be analyzed along the lines of the model in this paper. These
Forms of social capital have tended in the past to be discussed rather informally, without a clear
accounting of their likely costs and benefits. This paper provides a starting point from which to
derive a more systematic understanding of the relationship between non-market organizations
and the market.
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Chapter 2
Inequality and the Dual Economy:
Technology Adoption with Specific
and General Skills
Summary 2 Slow technology diffusion has important consequences for income inequality. Across
countries, it can account for much of world inequality. Within countries, the arrival of new tech-
nologies often causes popular concern that the wages of some workers will fall. In developing
countries, diffusion is often represented in the stylized form of a "dual economy," in which a
gradually increasing fraction of workers use modern technology, while the remainder use tradi-
tional technology. This paper generates this pattern of technology adoption endogenously, and
shows that it causes the wages of some workers to fall. Diffusion is slow because production
requires both skills that are equally useful with any vintage of technology and skills that are im-
perfectly transferable across vintages. When these skills are sufficiently specific, a dual economy
is optimal, even though intermediate technologies are also available. Workers with transferable
skills disproportionately join the modern sector, leaving those with specific skills worse off. As
in classical trade models, changes in factor supplies affect the allocation of labor across sectors,
but not factor rewards. A dynamic extension shows that workers without transferable skills be-
come worse off throughout the period of transition to the modern technology. A further dynamic
extension applies the model to developed countries.
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2.1 Introduction
Slow technology diffusion has important consequences for income inequality. Most obviously, a
large fraction of cross-country income differences can be explained by differences in technology.1
The way in which developing countries adopt technology is therefore of considerable interest.
This is often represented in the stylized form of a "dual economy," in which a gradually increas-
ing fraction of workers use modern technology, while the remainder use traditional technology.2
This process is a common justification for the Kuznets Curve, according to which inequality in-
creases early in modernization and later decreases. The dual economy is therefore one example
of the way in which technology diffusion can affect income inequality within countries, as well as
across them. In fact, it is often claimed that new technologies not merely raise inequality, but
can actually leave some workers worse off in absolute terms. This was notoriously believed to
be the case, for instance, by the Luddites during the Industrial Revolution. Their claims had
at least superficial plausibility: the handloom weavers of Lancashire, for example, lost three
quarters of their earnings over a thirty year period from the 1790s to the 1820s.3 More recently,
technical change is often cited as a reason for increased inequality in the US since the 1970s,
and sometimes as an explanation for the falling wages of many US workers over much of that
time.
This paper presents a simple framework to unify these observations on technology diffusion
through a dual economy and its effect on wages. Any vintage of technology requires for produc-
tion both general skills that can easily be transferred across vintages and specific skills that are
imperfectly transferable. Technologies diffuse slowly because, on arrival, new technologies are
biased towards general skills. As a result, so long as specific skills are sufficiently specific, and
there is a large enough supply of them, two vintages of technology are simultaneously in use.
Because the modern technology favors general skills, the modern sector is relatively general-skill
intensive. This reduces the absolute wage of specific-skill workers, who mainly work with the
old technology but with fewer complementary inputs. Wages are set by relative productivity in
the two sectors, independent of factor supplies. An economy is "developed" when it is optimal
1See, for example, Hall and Jones (1999).
2For a recent example, see Banerjee and Newman (1998). For the canonical discussions, see Lewis (1954)
and Harris and Todaro (1969).
3 For more on the plight of the handloom weavers, see Blythell (1969).
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to close the traditional sector entirely, and use only modern technology instead. Much of the
intuition for the model is exactly parallel to that of a small open economy in classical trade
models.
While the static model illustrates why wages of some workers fall on arrival of new technol-
ogy, it cannot describe the process of diffusion or changes in wages during modernization. The
dynamic model considers these questions. In the dynamic model, external learning-by-doing
yields a gradual increase in the specific skills required for the modern technology.4 Eventually,
enough skills are acquired in the modern sector so that the traditional sector closes entirely.
Wages of workers with specific skills continue to fall throughout the transition, and only start
to recover when the traditional sector closes. The model therefore generates a strong form of
Kuznets Curve. The model is easily extended to developed countries. In developed countries,
there is a balanced growth path involving the use of this period's frontier technology and last pe-
riod's frontier technology. Economies endowed with more workers with transferable skills have
larger modern sectors, and as a result equilibrium efficiency of specific-skill workers is higher in
both sectors. An increased rate of technical progress and increased transferability of specific
skills each have ambiguous effects on equilibrium inequality, although increased transferability
certainly increases inequality initially.
The idea that some human capital is vintage specific has been explored in several previous
papers. The key paper in the literature is Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). In Chari and
Hopenhayn, all human capital is equally vintage-specific, and this leads to their interest in the
response of the lifetime pattern of earnings to changes in technical progress. In particular,
they are interested in the complementarity between experienced and inexperienced workers
in the same vintage. Most other models of vintage human capital do not emphasise the
complementarity between types that is the focus of interest here. These include Aghion,
Howitt and Violante (2002), who consider the effect of GPTs, Krueger and Kumar (2004), and
Galor and Tsiddon (1997), who develop a rich model of growth focusing on intergenerational
mobility and ability.
Much of the extensive literature investigating why developing countries adopt new technol-
4Stokey (1991) has considered learning-by-doing with human capital. Famous empirical examples of the
importance of learning-by-doing include David (1975) and Lucas (1993).
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ogy slowly or not at all does not consider technology diffusion through a dual economy. Instead,
it assumes that developing countries as a whole adopt a succession of better technologies. Most
of the time, this is implicit, and slow adoption is the result of exogenous country differences
such as productivity differences (Zeira (1998)) or barriers to adoption (Parente and Prescott
(1994)). Keller (1996) is somewhat closer to the current paper in considering the relationship
between technology opening and human capital. 5 In Basu and Weil (1998), this approach is
explicit, as developing countries develop by using "appropriate technology," that is technology
intermediate between the traditional technology and the frontier.
By contrast, most existing papers on a dual economy assume the existence of precisely
two modes of production, rather than generating this as an optimal outcome, as here. An
example is Beaudry and Francois (2004), who assume exactly two technologies and emphasize
a complementarity between experienced and inexperienced workers different types of workers
in learning about the new technology. 6 In other papers, the older technology survives because
some non-competitive factor retards adoption of the new technology.7
A vast literature considers the interaction between technical change and inequality. The
possibility that new technology can make some workers worse off in absolute terms has also been
of persistent interest to economists at least since Ricardo's famous chapter on "Machinery" in
the 1821 edition of his Principles. Only a few papers generate this prediction, and most of
these rely on complementarity between different types of workers. In Acemoglu (1999), the
complementarity arises because the economy is not perfectly competitive, but involves instead
search and screening. Kremer (1993 and 1997) and Kremer and Maskin (1995) are closer in
spirit to the present model, in that the O-ring production function can generate behaviour
similar to that described here even with perfect competition. But the production function is
highly non-standard, and they do not consider the transition to a modern economy. Beaudry
and Green (2002) also generate falls in wages for some workers derived from complementary
factors and two possible production technologies. However, their model focuses on explaining
recent changes in the US wage distribution by considering a one-time introduction of a new,
5Another paper concerned with slow adoption caused by human capital is Kremer and Thomson (1998).
6In an extension, they consider multiple technology steps, that could lead to an endogenous dual economy.
But their main interest is in comparing steady states rather than exploring this possibility.
7Banerjee and Newman (1998), for example, are concerned with imperfect credit markets. Acemoglu and
Shimer (2002) generate technology dispersion from search, although they do not impose exactly two technologies.
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permanently skill-biased technology to a developed economy.
The paper proceeds by developing static results in Section 2 , before turning to dynamic
results and learning in Section 3. Some possible extensions to allow for supply responses and
multi-good settings are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The Static Model
This section introduces the static model of technology adoption with vintage-specific human
capital. Interpreted literally, the static model represents the effect on an economy in steady
state of the exogenous introduction of a set of new, but not fully understood, technologies. Such
a pure experiment may occasionally have occured, for instance after the fall of the Tokugawa
Shogunate in Japan or the loss of the Opium Wars in China. More broadly, however, it
approximates the many instances when developing countries have switched from inward-looking
policy regimes to policies favoring trade and foreign investment. To establish the intuition
for the model, I first use Lerner diagrams to describe a dual equilibrium geometrically, before
describing the model algebraically. I establish the conditions under which the dual or separating
equilibrium involves using the traditional technology and the frontier technology, rather than a
single interior technology.
2.2.1 A Graphical Representation
As foreshadowed in the introduction, much of the intuition in the present model is similar
to the intuition that comes from considering a small open economy in classical trade models.
Adapting the graphical analysis from that literature highlights three key points about the
dual equilibrium. First, it shows the circumstances under which a dual economy, rather
than universal adoption of an intermediate technology, will indeed be optimal. Second, it
highlights the importance of factor endowments and the cone of diversification. An economy
insufficiently endowed with general skills never opens a modern sector, while an economy with
enough workers with general skills operates only the modern sector. Finally, it highlights that
wages in an economy within the cone of diversification are determined purely by the relative
position of the isoquants, independent of relative factor supplies.
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Figure 2-1: Equilibrium with Two Technologies
In the Lerner diagram in Figure 2.1, perfectly competitive firms choose their factor inputs
and production technology, subject to factor prices. The quantity of general-skill labor appears
on the vertical axis, that of specific-skill labor on the horizontal axis. The endowment of this
economy, which consists of supplies of general and specific-skill labor, is at point E0 . The two
available technologies are represented by the isoquants Io and Im. Im, the modern technology, is
general-skill biased, since at any given factor-price ratio it employs relatively more general-skill
labor. 8
In equilibrium, both technologies are used so long as the endowment of the economy lies
within the cone of diversification, defined by the area between the rays OA and OB. In that case,
factor prices are determined solely by the relative position of the two isoquants, as illustrated
by the factor price line, ww: relative supplies do not affect relative prices. The factor price line
can also be interpreted as an isocost line.
If the endowment is at a point such as E1 , the supply of general skill is so great that the
8In the trade literature, these are "unit value" isoquants, which can be drawn because output prices are fixed
in a small open economy. Here, they are simple isoquants, because all firms produce the same good.
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specific-skill intensive technology is not used. This is because no convex combination of the rays
OA and OB can attain point E1 , so factor markets cannot clear. With endowment E1 , firms
use only the technology represented by isoquant I, and relative supplies once again determine
factor prices. The relative price of the abundant factor, G, must be lower than when both
technologies are in use.
Now consider introducing other technologies whose factor bias lies somewhere between that
of 1o and I. Facing the same factor prices, these technologies will be used if and only if
some point oni the new isoquants lies below the factor price line. In Figure 2.2, the technology
associated with isoquant I' is unprofitable, whereas the technology represented by isoquant I"
will replace one or both of the previous technologies. Which one is replaced depends on the
factor endowment of the economy. If there is a continuum of technologies such as I' or I",
none will be used so long as none of them have isoquants that cross the factor price line. In this
case, the two extreme technologies, Io and Im, are used. This is the dual economy equilibrium.
Because isoquants are convex, the isoquant crosses the factor price line if and only if it is
below the factor price line at the point where its tangent is parallel to it. Therefore, the two
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Figure 2-3: An Equilibrium Dual Economy
extreme technologies are used so long as the set of these points lies entirely above the factor
price line, as in Figure 2.3. A sufficient but not necessary condition for characterising this set is
that it be weakly concave. Economically, this requires that new technologies be "sufficiently"
skill-biased.
Having established informally the key features of a dual equilibrium relating to factor en-
dowments, factor prices and the characteristics of technology, I turn to the algebraic analysis.
2.2.2 Production
The economy consists of perfectly competitive firms, all of which have access to a well under-
stood constant returns to scale production technology. The productivity of this technology
is indexed by a. Production uses only specific skills and general skills. Consider the in-
troduction of a continuum of new technologies, indexed by a E (a ° , am], where am is the most
modern technology available, assumed to be the world technology frontier. The key assumption
here is that firms face a menu of possible technological choices: they are not constrained to
use either the frontier or the traditional technology. This assumption seems quite reasonable.
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For example, it seems reasonable to suppose that technical progress continually expands the
technological frontier, without eliminating the previous frontier technologies. This issue will
be explored further in the dynamics.
Production by firm i takes the CES form:
Yi = ai[ASp + (1 -A)GP] / P
where Si and Gi are the effective inputs of specific and general skill labor demanded by the
firm and ai is the vintage of technology chosen by the firm. Note that p E (-oo, 1) and that
the elasticity of substitution is a = 1p. For convenience, normalise output by a':
t5 -Yi = ri [Sp + (1 - A)GP], P(2.1)
where ri [1, m] is equal to a i, the ratio of output produced using the new technology to
a
o
output produced using the old technology, for the same effective factor inputs to each.
Workers are endowed with either specific human capital or general human capital, or some
combination of the two. To aid discussion, it is often convenient to assume that each worker
is endowed with one unit of either specific or general human capital. Accordingly, the units of
each type demanded by the firm can also be thought of as workers of each type. A worker
endowed with one unit of general human capital can supply one efficiency unit to any vintage
of technology. A worker endowed with one unit of specific human capital can supply one
efficiency unit of specific capital to firms using a° , but strictly less to firms using other vintages
of technology. The number of efficiency units of specific human capital supplied by a specific-
skill worker is described by the declining function e(ri), which by definition is equal to one
when ri is equal to one. This is the transferability function.
Denote by si the number of units of specific-skill capital that a firm hires, and gi the number
of general-skill units. Then the effective quantity of labor used by the firm is:
Si = e(ri)si where e(1) = 1, e'(ri) < 0 V ri C [1, m] (2.2)
Gi = gi (2.3)
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The key assumption is that efficiency units of specific-skill labor supplied per worker decrease as
the technology used becomes increasingly remote from the accustomed technology. Although
it is not essential to the results that e (ri) be differentiable or continuous, this is assumed for
now.
Since firms are perfectly competitive, they choose ri, si and gi to maximise
r i[Ae (ri)p si + ( - )gi ]- (wsSi + WG9i), (2.4)
where the price of output is normalised to one.
There are no externalities in this problem, and hence, although it is non-convex, the First
Welfare Theorem applies. That is, the perfectly competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
The mathematical appendix shows that the competitive equilibrium allocation is the same
as the social planner's allocation. This is true whether or not the economy lies within the
cone of diversification defined by the available technologies, and hence whether or not the dual
equilibrium is optimal.
2.2.3 Technology Choice
It is helpful to rewrite the production function, equation 2.1, as
1
Yi= [A(ri)Pse + (1 - A)gp'". (2.5)
where (rj) re(ri). This formulation highlights that, for given factor inputs, production
is an increasing function of both ri and (ri). If '(ri) > 0, better technology automatically
raises production, and all firms use the newest technology. Older technology is therefore only
ever used under the following assumption.
Assumption A2: Assume that (1) = 1,~'(r) < 0,~"(r) > 0.
Although the assumption that '(r) < 0 is necessary in order to allow older technologies to
be useful, the assumption of convexity is less obvious. So long as the efficiency of specific-skill
workers is always strictly positive, some segment of the function will asymptote towards zero
(or a positive constant) and hence be concave over this range. In fact, this is all that is required
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for a dual equilibrium.9 Since it seems likely that an extra worker could always do something
useful, this assumtion seems reasonable. In particular, if there are no problems in contracting,
a worker can always pay for the cost of any training, so the remainder of their time must have
weakly positive marginal product.
Associated with the CES production function is the unit cost function,
1 [Fws w1 weeP
ci(ws, wgri) = r + where 1 (2.6)
This is a convenient way to consider the firm's optimal choice of technology, because it requires
optimising only over ri, rather than simultaneously over the factor input ratio. The following
lemma and proposition establish the conditions under which a dual equilibrium exists.
Lemma 5 If a dual equilibrium exists, the unit cost function must exhibit a turning point
somewhere in the range r E [1, m].
Proof. The unit cost function is a continuous function in r whose domain is the compact
subset r [1, mi]. Therefore, by Weierstrass's Theorem, it must attain its global maximum
and minimum on the domain. If a dual equilibrium exists, profits must be zero at r = {1, m}.
Hence, by the mean value theorem, there must be a point rt E (1, m) such that c'(rt) = O. 
Proposition 8 If a dual equilibrium exists, Assumption A2 is a suJficient condition for it to
be unique.
Proof. If the dual equilibrium exists, the turning point in the cost function must be a
maximum. Differentiating the unit cost function, equation 2.6, shows that at a turning point,
-1 [~ + ] {e(r; -+ ( 1- } 0. (2.7)
r2 A~e(r)17 (1- A) A l e(r)7+ l- (1-A) - - 0.
Equivalently, the turning point occurs when
61 (r) _ w98T A 
e(r)77+ kWS i-A)
9For appropriate factor endowments, so long as there is some technology F for which the assumption is true
V r > , a dual equilibrium exists, although the "traditional" technology in that case will be r. This property
is discussed in more detail in the dynamics.
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Evaluated at the turning point, the second derivative has the opposite sign to
C"(r)e(r) 1` + ae(r)Ie' (r) '(r), (2.8)
where a --(7 + 1) > 0. But under assumption A2, this expression is always greater than
zero. Therefore, any turning point must be a maximum, and must therefore also be unique. 
2.2.4 Static Equilibrium
Proposition 1 establishes that, if a turning point exists, it is unique and a maximum, and
that therefore all firms will use either the traditional technology or the modern technology.
However, the proposition does not establish the conditions under which such a turning point
exists, since these depend on the equilibrium factor price ratio. To proceed, it is therefore most
convenient to solve for a dual equilibrium on the assumption that one exists, and then solve for
the conditions under which this is indeed the equilibrium.
Assuming that the dual equilibrium exists, what are its properties? The system contains
six variables, the two wage rates and four employment outcomes, namely general and specific
employment in the modern and traditional sectors. The traditional (old) sector is denoted with
an o subscript, the modern sector with an m subscript. (With constant returns to scale, it is of
course unnecessary to distinguish sectoral choices from firm choices). Efficiency of specific-skill
labor in the modern sector, e(m) is written em. Economy-wide supplies of specific and general
skill labour are and 9. The equilibrium conditions are:
-pws = AsP-[Aso P+ (1- A)gp] (2.9)
= em m [~ mSm + - P (2.10)
WG = (1 - )P 1[P + (1-)gP]'P (2.11)
= (1-A)gm-m[AePmSPm + (1-A)gPm] p (2.12)
SO + Sm = (2.13)
go gm = (2.14)
Taking the ratio WGIWS with respect to both technologies and equating yields the equilib-
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rium relationship between factor ratios in the two sectors. It is convenient to switch variables
and work in terms of 0i, the ratio of general-skill to specific-skill labour in each industry.
O5m = Pm-~( < Xm ) = em 1. (2.15)
It is clear from equation 2.15 that the modern sector is relatively general-skill intensive if and
p
only if ep -1 > 1. Since em < 1, this can be true only if p1 < 0, that is p > 0 ( > 1). Most
existing estimates of labor substitution elasticities suggest that different types of labor have
have a greater than unit substitution elasticity. For example, if general capital is associated
with higher levels of education, the consensus estimates of the elasticity of substitution cluster
around 1.5 or so.10 Other types of human capital, such as different potential experience groups,
appear to be still more easily substitutable. 11 Since the limited evidence on the topic accords
with the intuition that holders of general skills should be those to gain from technical change,
I make the following assumption. 12
Assumption A3: p > 0, or equivalently ar > 1: factors are gross substitutes.
Given that p > 0, equation 2.15 shows that the frontier sector is more general-skill biased
relative to the traditional sector when specific skills are relatively inefficient at the frontier.
That is, a fall in em increases the factor bias of the frontier sector compared to the traditional
sector. This expression can be used to gain quantitative estimates of the magnitude of differ-
ences in skill-ratios across sectors. If a is about 1.5, approximately the rate of substitution
estimated in various US studies between college graduates and high-school educated workers,
then if em = , the modern sector will be about 1.4 times as general-skill intensive as the tra-2'
ditional sector. If efficiency is much lower, say em = , then the modern sector will be about
2.2 times as general-skill intensive as the traditional sector. Allowing for a larger elasticity
of substitution produces larger effects; for em = 1 the frontier sector is twice as general skill2'
intensive as the traditional sector when a = 2 and four times as intensive when a = 3.
Equating specific and general skill wages across sectors yields the equilibrium factor ratio
'
0See Katz and Murphy (1992), Card and Lemieux (2001), and Johnson (1997).
"See Card and Lemieuz (2001) and Borjas (2003).
'
2 The assumption is important for the interpretation of the results, but not for the results themselves. That
is, a dual economy can certainly exist with a lower substitution elasticity, in which case the winners and losers
from new technology are reversed relative to the analysis here.
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in the traditional sector (for convenience, written to the power p):
lA) I ( m 2-p- 16)
Equilibrium requires that mem < 1, which is guaranteed by Assumption A2. Note that
the equilibrium factor ratio is determined purely technologically: factor supplies play no role.
Combining equations 2.15 and 2.16 to solve for (]m shows that Am relies on exactly the same
set of variables as 00, namely technological variables but not factor supplies.
Since relative factor supplies do not affect industry factor intensities, nor can they affect
relative wages. The equilibrium wage ratio is a simple transformation of factor intensity in the
traditional sector:
WG = (1 A) oP-l (2.17)
WS A 
The ratio of general to specific-skill wages is increasing in specific-skill intensity in the traditional
sector. This is intuitive: relative wages of general skill workers (the "wage premium") are higher
when they are relatively scarce in the traditional sector.
It remains to solve for the equilibrium allocation of workers between the two sectors. The
market clearing relationships, equations 2.13 and 2.14, can be rearranged as follows:
(1 -6)0o + m = and
(1 )1 + 1 1 
where is the fraction of specific skill workers employed in the modern sector, and -y is the
corresponding variable for general skill workers.13
1 3These equations can be derived as follows. Dividing the g market clearing equation by gives
= gm goNow s
Now just multiply the first term on the right by ~ the second by - and rearrange.
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Using these as the market clearing variables,
6 = ( 1) and (2.18)q~(emT - an
( f ) (elks-l) (2.19)
Since factor intensity within each sector is unrelated to the economy-wide factor ratio, it
is clear from equations 2.18 and 2.19 that both and y are unambiguously increasing in .
The more general-skill workers an economy possesses, the greater the fraction of both general
and specific-skill workers allocated to the modern sector. While the economy maintains a dual
structure, a greater fraction of general-skill workers than specific-skill workers will always work
in the modern sector, since
e > - m
In short, changes in factor supplies change the allocation of labor between the traditional
and modern sectors, but do not affect relative factor intensities, just as the graphical analysis
suggests. However, if factor supplies change to the point where the economy lies outside the cone
of diversification, there are important consequences. An economy insufficiently endowed with
general skill labor to lie within the cone of diversification uses only the traditional technology,
and never adopts the new technology. Conversely, an economy abundantly endowed with
general skill labor may also lie outside the cone of diversification, and close the traditional
sector entirely.
Since 6 and -y must both be between 0 and 1, the market clearing conditions formally provide
the conditions under which the dual economy exists. The economy is backward, meaning no
modern sector opens, if
O=<- X=> )(-m ) 1 el(2.20)Zp<~po:I [_- A)1- (rm'-1)I
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The economy is modern, meaning the traditional sector closes entirely, if
) > 'mn =oem
it A ) ) ~M a-i) ] em .(2.21)1~~~~~ r --
Whether the economy lies within the cone of diversification is therefore determined by com-
paring the factor endowment of the economy with the required factor ratios of the traditional
and modern sectors. Other things being equal, the cone of diversification is wider when em is
lower, that is, there is a greater difference between the desired factor ratios in the two sectors.
2.2.5 Comparative Statics
How does the dual equilibrium change in response to parameter changes? Since the factor
intensity of the traditional (and modern) sector is independent of factor supplies, it changes
only with changes in technology. In particular, consider the effects of greater technological
backwardness (a greater value of m), and of greater specific-skill efficiency (greater em). Since
frontier efficiency depends on the distance to the frontier, em = e(m), there is both a direct and
an indirect effect of changes in m. In the comparative statics that follow, I consider the direct
effect of m in isolation before considering the total effect of a change in m. In most cases the
indirect effect offsets the direct effect, and without specifying a functional form for e(m) it is
not possible to determine which effect dominates.
Turning first to technological backwardness, take the partial derivative of equation 2.16
holding efficiency constant, in order to isolate the pure effect of being more relatively backward:
O~°P (1 ) - (°a - 1)-m-2-0g  A (- l- 1) 2 ) [ 1 e%- ] < 0.
Therefore, the general-skill intensity of the traditional sector declines in initial backwardness.
If a relatively more advanced technology becomes available, or if a more backward country
opens to world technology, the traditional sector becomes less general-skill intensive. Turning
to changes in the efficiency of specific skills,
_ _ 
'Il 
_ _ _ _ 
_ _ _ _ _ 
_0Pem < 0
ihem 1 - A r ma - 1 1
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When skills are less specific (em is relatively high), the general skill intensity of the tradi-
tional sector also falls. This result is more surprising: when specific-skill workers are more
efficient at working in the modern sector, the traditional sector becomes less general-skill in-
tensive, that is, employs relatively more specific-skill workers.
What about the total effect of a change in m? This is
d0 _ -A (( -1) 2 [em-2 (em + me' (m)) (ma - 1) + 1 - (mem)-1] . (2.22)
dm 1 - (Ta-i _ 1)2 J
The direct effect dominates if equation 2.22 is less than zero. This is true if
em (Ma 1 ) + me'(m) > 0.
Intuitively, this condition says that the direct effect dominates so long as the indirect effect
on efficiency, me' (m) < 0, is not too great. Recall that by assumption, em + me' (m) < O.
Therefore, the direct effect can dominate only if m-1 > 1. However, assumption A2 also
guarantees that this is true, since (me)a - 1 < 1. Therefore, no unambiguous prediction for
the total effect of technological backwardness on factor intensity in the traditional sector is
possible. For the other comparative statics, I therefore focus on the direct effect alone.
For the frontier sector, the corresponding partial derivatives are:
--- m <05Om = 0 e- < 
O9m 0or 
a0m - '90° el-a, _ (a `)eT 0 < 0
Oem - aem (o, 1)e--
The frontier sector is less general-skill intensive when relative backwardness is greater, and
when specific-skills are more efficient at the frontier. Factor intensity in the frontier sector
therefore behaves in the same way as factor intensity in the traditional sector, rather than, as
perhaps may have been expected, offsetting it.
Since, holding efficiency constant, a more relatively backward economy (greater m) is less
general-skill intensive in each sector, the general-skill intensive sector, namely the frontier, must
be larger. Similarly, for a given level of relative backwardness, if specific-skill workers are more
efficient at the frontier, the frontier sector is larger. These results are summarised below, with
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reference to the fraction of specific-skill workers () and general-skill workers (y) employed in
the frontier sector.
o06_ -1 [o (q_5 _ - > 0
ad -1 00o em (c- )( (P o)
O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
_
thy _ -em Ike(X0 _ - ) > 0ar" 1-O ~- 1 o)a
Oem 1 (em -1) l Oem (e-a ) J
As with factor intensity, the offsetting effects of technological backwardness and specific-skill
efficiency render impossible an unambiguous prediction for the total effect of technological back-
wardness. If, empirically, greater initial backwardness slows adoption of new technology, this
suggests that the indirect effect through reduction of specific skills dominates. Leapfrogging-
type hypotheses would be consistent with a smaller indirect effect.
Turning to relative wages, equation 2.17 establishes a simple relationship between the wage
premium (G) and the general-skill intensity of the traditional sector. The wage premium is
rising with technological backwardness, since
aOmj) -- (1A (P_ 1 )Op-2aO0o > 0.
Similarly, with regard to the efficiency of specific skills,
(--)- = (1_A (P- 1)p-2 O > 0.
Oem,, A )kP oem
The wage premium is therefore increasing in the efficiency of specific skills. This is sur-
prising, since increases in the efficiency of specific-skill workers in the frontier sector (higher
em) are effectively just specific-skill augmenting technical changes. In a standard setting with
or > 1, specific-skill biased technical change reduces the premium to general-skill labour. In
this setting, by contrast, increases in the efficiency of specific-skill workers make the frontier
sector relatively more productive, and hence expand the frontier sector. Since the frontier is
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relatively general-skill intensive, however, this requires reducing the general-skill intensity of
both sectors. But this leaves specific-skill workers relatively worse off than before, as now in
both sectors they have fewer complementary general-skill workers with whom to work.
While the comparative statics have focused on relative wages, in fact the wage of specific-
skill workers falls in absolute terms. How can this be? As frontier efficiency increases, the
general-skill intensity of both sectors falls. Workers in the traditional sector have not gained
directly from increases in efficiency at the frontier; their technology is exactly as it was before.
But now specific-skill workers in the traditional sector, using the same technology, have fewer
complementary inputs, in the form of general-skill workers, with whom to work. Therefore,
their marginal product, and thus also their wages, must have declined. Specific-skill workers
are worse off in absolute terms than before the introduction of new technology throughout the
entire range of em for which the dual economy persists.
Most models of biased technical change do not predict that wages of some workers actually
fall. As noted in the introduction, those that do typically rely on settings deviating from
perfect competition, or unusual production functions such as the O-ring production function.
In contrast, the prediction is generated here using an entirely standard neo-classical setting
and production function, and requires only that different types of workers are both required
for production. The model is intuitive in that losers from technical progress are those who
disproportionately continue for some time to use older technology. However, this is a more
subtle prediction than simply that the losers will be those left behind using the old technology
- the losers are those who have a comparative advantage in the use of old technology, whether
or not they as individuals actually continue to use it. For example, the model predicts that the
Lancashire handloom weavers lose wages during the Industrial Revolution. But more broadly,
workers whose skills are close substitutes, such as many mill workers at the time, are also
predicted to suffer wage losses relative to before the introduction of new technology.
2.3 Dynamics
The model discussed so far represents a one-time opening of an economy to a new technology.
However, the broader questions are how countries modernize after they open, and what happens
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to wages over the course of modernization. I consider the dynamics first with a fixed frontier
and then with a moving frontier. The first case is useful in fixing intuition and, it turns out,
is a reasonable approximation to the case of a developing country opening to new technology.
The second case is particularly interesting in the context of developed countries, and allows
comparison with some of the literature on GPTs. Moreover, it highlights the role of general
human capital, not merely as a factor of production alongside specific skills, but in helping
achieve a higher equilibrium level of efficiency when there is ongoing technical progress. This
ties the idea of general human capital back to the Nelson-Phelps literature on human capital
as aiding adaptability. 1 4
2.3.1 A fixed frontier
Assume there is an overlapping generations economy, in which workers live for two periods. In
the first, they either go to school to gain general skills or gain experience and specific skills on
the job. Assume the choice between the two is exogenous, and that the marginal productivity
of workers gaining specific skills on the job is zero in their first period of life. In the second
period of their lives, everyone works and participates in training (costlessly) the members of
the next generation.
The only choice made by any workers is made by specific skill workers, who choose in what
sector to gain experience. Assume perfect foresight, so wages in the two sectors will be equal,
exactly as in the static model. Since knowledge is cumulative and young workers receive
training in their sector of choice, efficiency in the modern sector increases over time, towards its
upper bound of unity. This learning-by-doing is assumed to be entirely external; alternatively,
existing workers do not benefit from learning this period and do not take into account the utility
14Gellner highlights the importance of general human capital to modern, technologically dynamic societies in
contrast to traditional societies: "A society ... based in the last analysis on economic growth ... is thereby
committed to the need for innovation and hence to a changing occupational structure. From this it follows
that certainly between generations ... men must be ready for reallocation to new tasks. Hence, in part, the
importance of generic training (Gellner 1983), 32)."
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of their descendants. Assume that knowledge is accumulated according to some function:
em,t+l = 4 (it (t, em,t, m) ,em,t), (2.23)
where Ad > 0, ?/2 < , e > , f/ee < 0
-= f(em,t; t, m), (2.24)
wherefe > 0, f>0, f m > 0.
Next period's efficiency is an increasing function of this period's efficiency and of the fraction
of specific-skill workers employed in the modern sector (since this increases the opportunities
for learning). Although the returns to each of these are decreasing individually, this does not
guarantee that the function f(em,t; Obt) is concave in em,t. The learning function is guaranteed
to be concave in e only if the cross partial, e is negative. Otherwise, the learning function
may be convex or S-shaped in e. Intuitively, the curve might be S-shaped if at low levels of
e7nt, learning is slow because relatively few workers are in the modern sector, and at high levels
of em,t, learning is slow because of the decreasing rate of learning in em,t despite having almost
all labor allocated to the modern sector.
On the reasonable assumption that no learning takes place if the modern sector is not open
(4' (0, em,t) = e,t), it is clear that a factor endowment that lies below the cone of diversification
now has serious implications for the long term growth of the economy. Any economy with a
sufficient supply of general skills to open the modern sector at all eventually converges to
complete modernization. By contrast, if the economy is insufficiently endowed with general skill
labor for the modern sector to open, the economy stagnates, remaining an entirely traditional
economy permanently, even with freely available modern technology.
Since, for a given level of efficiency, the rate of learning is determined by , the same
comparative statics apply to the rate of learning as to . In particular, for a given level of
initial efficiency, countries with a greater supply of general-skill labor modernize more quickly.
This appears quite reasonable and is consistent with historical experience. For example, during
the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, Germany and the US both experienced more
rapid growth than Britain in the then modern sectors such as the chemical industry. Britain's
relative failure to compete in these industries has been blamed in part on the failure of its
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education system to provide a sufficient supply of scientists and other skilled workers.1 5
Once the learning function is understood, the dynamic path of wages and the sectoral
allocation of labor in the economy can easily be analyzed as a sequence of comparative statics.
Considering first the input ratios, at the moment of introduction, the modern sector is much
more general-skill intensive than either the economy as a whole or the traditional sector. As
em increases, the general-skill intensity of both sectors falls, although the general-skill intensity
of the modern sector falls more rapidly. Once efficiency rises to the point implicitly defined by
equation 2.21, the desired skill intensity of the modern sector falls to the skill intensity of the
economy as a whole: at this point, the traditional sector shuts down.
Turning to the wage premium, since opening reduces the general skill-intensity of the tradi-
tional sector, specific-skill wages fall on opening. The wage premium increases monotonically
with em until the traditional sector shuts down. Only once the economy has fully modernized
do further increases in em increase earnings of specific-skill workers. Wage inequality returns
to its original level when specific-skill workers become fully efficient in the frontier sector. It is
interesting to note in this context that the last of the handloom weavers (who perhaps can be
taken as a proxy for the traditional sector as a whole) disappeared around the 1840s, around
the same time the general level of wages started to increase more noticeably. 16
Finally, throughout the period of adoption, the fraction of labor of both types working in
the modern sector increases monotonically, although a greater fraction of general-skill workers
always work in the modern sector, until the economy modernizes.
2.3.2 A moving frontier
The world technology frontier has so far remained fixed. Consider now exogenous technical
progress at rate x, so that the frontier technology at time t + n is described by
am (t + n) = a (t) xn. (2.25)
With a moving frontier, additional assumptions and notation are required concerning effi-
15See, for example, Broadberry and Ghosal (2002) on services and Chandler (1990) on manufacturing.
16See Blythell (1969) on the handloom weavers. Feinstein (1998) surveys the extensive literature on real wages
and presents evidence that real wage growth only picked up from the 1850s or 1860s.
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ciency across vintages. Efficiency in vintage i in period t is indexed as ei,t. If a sector is the
modern sector in period t, its efficiency in period t is denoted em,t. If it was the modern sector
in period t- 1, its efficiency in period t is denoted e,t. The transferability function generalizes
to:
em,t = h (e,t, x) (2.26)
where he > 0, hx < 0, hee < 0, hxx > 0, hex < 0
The transferability function stipulates that efficiency in the modern sector in period t is a
fimunction of two variables, current efficiency in the most advanced sector used last period, e,t,
and the technological distance between that sector and the modern sector this period, x. The
following assumption replaces Assumption A2:
Assumption A4: Let (e,t, x) - em,t = xh(e,t, x). Then (em,t, 1) = e,t,(x <
0, (XX < O.
As in the static model, this assumption guarantees that no intermediate vintages between
last period's frontier and this period's frontier will be used in equilibrium. However, it does
not guarantee that these two vintages will be used in equilibrium. This is because the older,
fully-understood traditional technology is still available. From the unit cost function, equation
2.6, it can be shown that for any given technology, , unit costs are equal to those in the modern
and traditional sectors (dropping time subscripts) if
~~~~~1~~~-p 
- * ( -- 1 ) (1 (m e ) )1 P (2.27)1- 1
If er > e, the traditional sector closes and the economy modernizes: it uses instead the current
period's frontier technology and last period's frontier technology.
It follows that, with a moving frontier, an economy in which two sectors are open can be
one of two types.
The first type is the developing country case. In this case, the two open sectors are the
traditional sector and the current frontier sector, which is continually updated. The continual
updating of the modern sector slows learning relative to the fixed frontier case. On the other
hand, continual increases in technology favor expanding the modern sector.
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If enough learning occurs, eventually the traditional sector will close. This occurs when
efficiency in last period's frontier vintage is sufficiently great. In equation 2.27, this involves
f = m. Rewriting the equation, the traditional sector is abandoned if
x
. > Mt 1 1 - ' ) (Tte,t ) 1-Pt~~~~~~
It follows that positive (net) learning need not actually occur in this economy in order for it to
eventually abandon the traditional sector, since continued technical advance reduces the critical
value of em required in order to modernize.
In the modern economy, there are still two open sectors, but these are now the current
frontier (denoted m) and last period's frontier (denoted o, since last period's frontier is the old
sector this period). A balanced growth path is achieved when the loss of frontier efficiency
caused by moving to the new frontier each period is exactly compensated for by learning over
the period during which a particular technology is on the frontier. With constant relative
efficiencies, the allocation of workers between the modern and the older technology is also
constant. From equations 2.24 and 2.26, this can be seen as the value of em such that
em = h (f (mk , x) ,x) .
A simple example of this fixed point is shown in Figure 2.4. The concave curve is the trans-
ferability function, mapping efficiency in this period's old sector to efficiency in this period's
frontier sector. The other curve, is the learning function, which maps efficiency in the modern
sector this period to efficiency in the old sector next period. In Figure 2.4, the learning curve
is convex, and so the equilibrium is unique. As noted, however, the learning curve need not
be strictly convex, and with a sufficiently S-shaped learning curve this economy can exhibit
multiple equilibria for certain values of 4. Increases in the supply of general skills raise the
learning function and can thereby eliminate the multiple equilibria.
The response of inequality to changes in parameters is quite complex. The ratio of factor
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Figure 2-4: Balanced Growth with a Moving Frontier
intensities across sectors is now
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Equation 2.31 shows that inequality increases when em increases, and falls when e increases.
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(2.31)
However, em and e may often change in the same direction. If eo, increases and falls, then
eo
inequality is unambiguously reduced, but if em rises, there is no clear prediction relating to
inequality.
Around the balanced growth path, it is possible to derive a rich set of comparative statics
with respect to technical change. Inequality can respond to at least three types of changes
in this economy. The first is an increase in skill transferability, such that the function h (.)
is shifted up. A second is an increase in the rate of learning, such that the function f (.) is
shifted out. Finally, there can be a change in the rate of technical progress, x.
Consider first an increased rate of transferability. This shifts up the transferability curve
without affecting the learning curve. In the first generation after such a shock, only em
increases, and hence inequality increases. In subsequent periods, however, e also rises, as
the higher starting point feeds into higher efficiency in the less advanced sector. Whether the
initial rise in inequality is entirely undone is not clear, since in equilibrium, e rises, but so
does em, so long as the learning curve crosses the transferability curve from below, as shown in
e,
Figure 2.4. This is true of any stable equilibrium. 17
By contrast, it is possible to sign the effect of an increase in learning. Shifting out the learn-
ing curve implies that equilibrium occurs at a point further along the concave transferability
function. Hence, e increases and decreases, both of which reduce inequality. Adjustment
eo
towards the new steady-state is monotonic: inequality decreases gradually towards its new
steady state.
The most obvious source of an increase in learning, for a given rate of technical advance, is
an expansion in the supply of general-skill labour. This increases learning by increasing the
size of the modern sector. Thus, the relative demand curve slopes down, effectively through a
quasi-Rybczynski effect.
Finally, consider the effect of a change in the rate of technical progress. Holding relative
efficiencies constant, an increase in the rate of technical progress increases the general-skill
premium. However, both the learning curve and the transferability curve are drawn for given
x, so this is not a satisfactory comparative static. Greater x shifts the transferability curve
17The initial shock to inequality when transferability increases is similar to the result in Aghion, Howitt and
Violante (2002), although with fixed supplies they argue inequality increases permanently, because they have no
general equilibrium effect on efficiency of older vintages.
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down. Although this reduces both e and e, it also implies a fall in e_, suggesting that the net
effect is ambiguous. Similarly, for a given level of efficiency, more resources will now move to
the modern sector. Hence, there will be greater learning for a given level of efficiency. It follows
that the learning curve must shift outwards as a result of an increase in the rate of technical
progress. This provides a further offsetting influence to the initial increase in inequality that
occurs as a result of an increased rate of technical progress.
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Supply Responses
Endogenising the supply of general relative to specific skills adds little to the intuition of the
model. The most important results, namely the dual economy and the changes in inequality,
are not affected, since these are independent of factor supplies. The first order effect of an
increase in e is to increase the premium paid to general skill workers. Therefore, if the supply
of general skill workers is not completely elastic, endogenising supply merely hastens the rate
at which the traditional economy converges to the modern economy. In the short run, this
implies that the wage premium actually goes up faster, the greater the increase in general-skill
workers. In other words, a time series regression of the wage premium on the relative supply
of general skill workers would be perversely signed.
Another implication of the model is that the process of adopting a new technology creates
large temporary quasi-rents to any specific skill workers who manage to acquire extra efficiency
units of labour at the frontier. This suggests a possible explanation for the growth of technical
education institutions in both developed and developing countries over recent decades, compared
to gaining experience on the job as in a traditional apprenticeship. Suppose that instead of
gaining experience on the job, it is possible to attend a technical college, which transfers a fixed
amount of efficiency units to a specific-skill labourer. Then a specific skill worker gains more
from going to technical college at a time of rapid technical change than when technologies are
relatively well understood. This is consistent with the general move away from apprenticeship
and other on-the-job training programs for specific-skill workers.
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2.4.2 Experience Effects
The dynamic section assumed zero marginal product in the first period. Suppose instead that
old workers gain some specific capital relative to young workers in the same sector, so that
experienced workers supply (1 + n) times as much effective labor as young workers. So long as
young and old workers are perfect substitutes, however, the ratio of their wages must be fixed.
Moreover, so long as n is the same in each sector, the ratio of young to old earnings must be
the same in both sectors. It follows that the lifetime path of earnings must be the same in
both sectors. Hence, wages for specific-skill workers must be equalised across sectors in all
periods. So a modification that allows young and old workers to be perfect substitutes would
have no effect on the model. What if young and old workers are imperfect substitutes, as in
Chari and Hopenhayn? For instance, suppose output is produced according to a nested CES
function such as:
Y = a {A [S" + (1-L) S2]P/r + (1- A)GP} 1/ P ,
where S1 is the effective supply of young specific-skill workers and S2 is the effective supply of
experienced specific-skill workers. So long as neither is more relatively substitutable for general
skill workers than the other, as in the production function above, this would introduce some
life-cycle dynamics along the lines of Chari and Hopenhayn without significantly affecting the
relationships of interest here. In fact, this extension would strengthen the results, since the
shortage of old workers in the frontier sector would further slow technology adoption. In short,
generalising the assumption of zero marginal productivity in the first period would complicate
the analysis without adding significantly to the insights of the model. 18
2.4.3 More than one good, trade and empirical applications
The model can easily be extended to consider the effect of vintage-specific skills in a context
where these skills are also industry-specific. Consider first the effect of technical change in only
l8Moreover, the complementarity between experienced and inexperienced workers may not be very large.
Estimates of the elasticity of substitution of workers across potential experience groups are around 5 to 10 (see
Card and Lemieux (2001), and Borjas (2003)). Although this probably overstates the substitutability of workers
with different actual experience within an industry, it is substantially different from Chari and Hopenhayn's
central case elasticity of about 1.1 ( = .1). Chari and Hopenhayn's effects are smaller, the larger the elasticity
of substitution.
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one sector. This increases output in the sector, reducing the price of the good. This introduces
an additional effect beyond that already modelled. The wage of specific-skill labour in this
sector must fall, but general skill labour continues to be paid the same amount. Hence, the key
prediction is that the wage premium in this sector increases. In general, with skills that are both
vintage and sector specific, the model provides a framework for considering industry-specific
skill differentials.
Price falls and/or output increases associated with new technology will be associated with
two observable developments within the affected sector. First, as described above, intra-
industry wage differentials rise. Second, the dispersion of skill-intensity across plants within
the industry increases. In the most extreme case, a technological opening, plants will go
from completely homogeneous to a split between modern, general-skill intensive plants and
traditional, specific-skill intensive plants.
What if new technologies simultaneously become available in all industries? The basic
prediction arising from a multi-good model is that the fastest-adopting industries will be those
that have the greatest steady-state general skill bias. Therefore, the industries that start out
as the most general-skill intensive will experience the greatest changes in intra-industry wage
differentials and intra-industry plant dispersion early in the period of adoption, while the others
follow.
Hence, if a developing country opens technologically, the most general-skill intensive goods
should fall furthest in price/grow most in output. Obviously the price prediction is no different
from Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory. But with vintage-sector-specific factors, no sector will
close entirely, even if prices are set exogenously at the world level. If trade causes prices to fall
most in relatively general-skill intensive sectors, specific-skill workers in that sector will be even
more adversely affected. Unlike the simple Heckscher-Ohlin model, therefore, this model is
consistent with increased inequality in poor countries that open their economies to trade (and
other forms of technology transfer).
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper has argued that a simple model of production in which general human capital and
vintage-specific human capital are complements in production is useful in thinking about a
number of issues in economic growth. The model builds on a couple of observations. First,
different vintages of technology are often used at the same time in (roughly) the same place.
Second, different workers are tied to particular tasks relating to a given level of technology to
greater or lesser degrees, and these workers are not perfect substitutes. Although the ability
to transfer skills across vintages is often related directly to ability, this paper has remained
agnostic on this point, since endogenising supply makes little difference to the results. Thus,
different degrees of transferability could relate to differences in innate ability, years of schooling,
or even different types of schooling, such as apprenticeships and university degrees. Finally,
new vintages of technology typically appear to benefit from learning-by-doing, and since workers
differ in the degree to which their skills are vintage-specific, it would not be too surprising if
learning-by-doing were also a biased process.
Developing these observations in the model leads to predictions consistent with some stylised
facts of technical change. In the model, different vintages of technology coexist, and there is
a dual economy if the economy starts out far enough behind the frontier. Technical change
has strong effects on the distribution of wage income. In particular, the introduction of a new
technology worsens the position of workers whose skills are relatively vintage-specific, both in
relative terms, and, more notably, in absolute terms. This effect is not limited to the workers
who continue to use the old technology, but is a general equilibrium effect common to workers
with specific-skills in both the old and the new technology. Moreover, the negative effect on
the wages of specific-skill workers actually increases as they become better acquainted with the
new technology, and it is only after the old technology is abandoned that inequality starts to
return to its initial level.
The dynamic version of the model extends these insights. Moreover, it illuminates the
similarities between dual economies in developing countries and the ongoing process of technical
development in developed countries. The eventual closure of the traditional sector suggests a
systematic way to think of the difference between developing and developed economies. The
developed country case of the model suggests a number of ways in which different types of
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technical change can affect inequality. For example, increases in the transferability of skills
across vintages have an ambiguous effect in general equilibrium, contrary to what is often found
ill papers that adopt a partial equilibrium analysis.
The paper suggests that the Luddites can be right: new technology can hurt some workers.
But it does not follow that policy should protect old industries. In fact, the reverse is true.
Since learning is external, the economy modernises inefficiently slowly, and the best policy is
to encourage the closure of old industries. Wages of lower skilled workers will not start to
recover until these industries close. In this spirit, it is interesting that the general level of
wages during the Industrial Revolution increased decisively only from around the 1840s, just as
old technologies, such as handloom weaving, finally disappeared. In a more modern context,
the model illuminates the decline of low-skilled wages in the US since the 1970s and the increase
in inequality amongst poor countries opening their economies. It also, however, gives some
grounds for hoping that these will be temporary phenomena, preceding, in both cases, sustained
future wage increases.
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2.6 Mathematical Appendix
2.6.1 Social Planner's Problem
In this appendix I sketch the proof that the resource allocation decision for the social planner
is equivalent to the allocation of resources achieved in competitive equilibrium.
The social planner maximizes
max Y = Jr[Ae(r)p (fs(r)) p+ (1 - A)(fg(r)p)P]Pd(r)
rf.s(r), fg (r)
subject to Jfs(r)d(r) = 1
r
and fg(r)d(r) = 1
r
where f (r) is the density function of specialists in the economy using a given vintage of tech-
nology.
To see the equivalence of this problem to the perfectly competitive problem, note that the
text has already shown the conditions under which it is true that, for any factor ratio, output
is always maximised at either r = 1 or r = m. Since by definition the social planner wishes to
maximize output, it follows that, if those conditions are satisfied, the social planner's allocation
will necessarily take the form
c if r= 1
f(s)- 0 if l<r<m
1-c if r m = 
where c is a constant to be solved for, and fg(r) can be defined similarly.
It follows that the social planner's problem is a simple constrained maximisation problem
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as follows:
1 1
max Y = [As + (1 -A)gp] 1 + m[AePsP + (1 -A)g] 
SOSw 0,go w
subject to so + w = -
and go + gw = .
It is obvious that the first order conditions of this problem require that the marginal product
of a particular type of worker must be equal in either sector. Since this is the same condition
as in the perfectly competitive problem and there are no externalities, the social planner's
allocation is identical to the perfectly competitive allocation.
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Chapter 3
When and Why did Technical
Change Become Skill-Biased?
Summary 3 This paper asks why, early in the modern era, technical change appeared to be
primarily deskilling, while in the modern era it appears primarily skill-biased. Whereas previous
explanations have focused on changes in technology, this paper suggests that changes in skills
themselves may have been at least as important. If little technical change is expected, workers
invest mainly in skills specific to a particular set of tasks. If they expect rapid technical change,
they invest in skills that enable them to cope with an array of different tasks. The model
also predicts that, with low rates of technical change, the modern sector is unskill-intensive,
whereas the reverse is true when technical change is faster. However, the wage premium does
not initially increase even after the modern sector has become skill-intensive, consistent with
historical experience in the early part of the twentieth century.
3.1 Introduction
Technical change in the modern world seems to be strongly skill-biased, in the sense that it
tends to raise the wages of highly-skilled workers relative to those of less-skilled workers.1 For
Throughout this paper, I will use the term skill-biased as a convenient shorthand to describe the situation
in which increases in the rate of technical change increase the skill premium. This is related to, but somewhat
distinct from, the term's more usual meaning, which focuses on relative complementarity between skills and
technical change in the production function.
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example, the increased inequality experienced in the US over the past three decades has often
been attributed to skill-biased technical change, particularly change associated with information
technology and computers. Technical change has probably favored skilled workers more than
unskilled workers for longer than the past thirty years: already in 1975, Tinbergen described the
evolution of the wage structure as a race between technological development and educational
advance. However, although these developments have by now inspired a large literature taking
for granted the complementarity between technology and skill, the two have not always been
partners. During the Industrial Revolution, for example, technical change primarily had the
effect of reducing the value of skills. Even in the first decades of the twentieth century, perhaps
the dominant forms of technical change were Fordism and Taylorism, approaches that explicitly
emphasized reducing the demand for skilled labor.
This paper proposes a new theory to explain how and why technical change went from being
primarily deskilling to primarily skill-biased. Instead of focusing on changes in the nature of
technology, as in the previous literature, I argue that endogenous changes in the nature of skills
themselves may have driven the changing effects of technology on the distribution of wages. The
key idea is that technical change is a double-edged sword for workers who invest in education
and skills: although it helps those with a capacity to learn new skills, it (relatively) harms those
whose skills are rendered obsolete. The net effect on skilled workers as a group depends on the
extent of their investment in these two different types of skills.
Intuitively, skills that can become obsolete are those that are specific to the performance of
certain tasks such as operating a hand loom or a piece of machinery. The master pin-maker in
The Wealth of Nations possessed these sorts of skills. Many other skills are less useful for the
performance of any particular task, but are helpful in adapting to a range of situations. For
example, the British empire was run largely by bureaucrats trained in classical Greek and Latin,
rather than by engineers, lawyers or economists. Today, many college graduates gain a wage
premium relative to their non-college educated peers despite not directly using the knowledge
gained in their college major. In all of these cases, what is rewarded is not a special ability
to perform any particular task but a general ability to perform a range of tasks or to adapt to
new tasks as they arise.
If the acquisition of skills can take either of these two forms, then the effects of technical
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change on the wage premium will vary depending on the sorts of skills most skilled workers
optimally choose to acquire. If the rate of technical progress is low, there is little chance that
any particular set of skills will become obsolete, and hence it is optimal to specialize. If, on the
other hand, there is rapid technical progress, and in particular rapid creative destruction, then
any particular set of skills that a worker acquires is quite likely to be obsolete by the time they
can be used, and accordingly workers will optimally choose instead to acquire more adaptable
skills. If, moreover, highly skilled workers are required to create new technologies, it is possible
to determine the rate of technical progress as a function of the productivity of the research
sector relative to the productivity of acquiring specific skills for production. Because skilled
wages fall with technical progress over some range, in a model with endogenous progress it is
possible to generate multiple equilibria, in which the rate of progress depends on each agent's
expectations of the skill investments made by other agents.
In this model, increases in the rate of creative destruction from a low base still leave most
skilled workers preferring to acquire general skills, which are, however, more risky and hence
less valuable than they were when there was a lower rate of creative destruction. Hence, it is
mainly unskilled workers, with relatively little to lose, who work in the modern sector. However,
once further increases in the rate of creative destruction entice skilled workers into acquiring
general skills, the modern sector becomes skill-intensive. When the rate of technical progress
is sufficiently great so that the modern sector absorbs all skilled workers, further increases in
the rate of technical progress aid the relative position of skilled workers.
Most previous discussions of changes in the effect of technology on the demand for skilled
labor have treated skills themselves as largely unchanged and focused on changes in technology
itself. One view is simply that different versions of technology - different generations of General
Purpose Technologies, perhaps - might exogenously differ in their skill requirements. Goldin
and Katz (1998) make essentially this argument in describing the shift from an artisanal system,
first to a factory system, and then to what they characterise as a more highly-skilled continuous
process system. One possible driving force for such changes is the introduction of successive
general purpose technologies, such as the electric dynamo, which Paul David and Gavin Wright
have argued increased the demand for flexibility (David and Wright (2003)). A more subtle
explanation is that the nature of technical change might be endogenous to other features of
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the economy. Acemoglu (2002) argues that, if technical change is "directed", then it makes
sense to develop technologies that exploit primarily the relatively abundant factor.2 Before
the early twentieth century, this was unskilled labor; since then, it has been skilled labor (see
also Acemoglu and Lester (2003)).
Although research on skill-bias and technology has, as noted, focused mainly on the effects
of technology itself, there has also, of course, been research into changes in education and skills.
Education has indeed changed dramatically over the past two centuries, in kind as well as in
quantity. Ernest Gellner links the changing requirements of the education system explicitly
to changes in the system of production. He notes that "The achievements of craft and art
production in [mature agrarian] societies are extremely labour- and skill-intensive, and often
reach levels of intricacy and perfection never remotely equalled by anything later attained by
industrial societies... the major part of training in industrial society is generic training... (1983,
pp26-7)." The history of education in America in the twentieth century is largely a history of
two episodes of dramatic expansion of formal education in predominantly general rather than
job-specific skills, these being the high school movement of the first quarter of the century and
the expansion of tertiary education in the decades following the Second World War.3
In addition to the vast literature on technical progress and the return to skills, several other
papers have considered technical progress and its relative effect on different types of skills.
My previous paper (2005) shows how, in a more general model of production, workers with
specific skills lose in absolute terms with the arrival of new technologies when they are to some
extent complementary inputs to workers with more portable skills. However, the question of
who optimally acquires which skills is not considered in that paper, and the rate of technical
progress is treated as exogenous. Krueger and Kumar (2004) also consider a choice between
what they label general and specific skills. In their model, however, there are no low-skilled
agents, and nor is there any creative destruction of specific skills. The model is therefore not
well suited to addressing changes in the wage premium that I consider here. Galor and Tsiddon
(1997) and Galor and Moav (2000) are both concerned with how the return to ability changes
with the rate of technical progress. In Galor and Tsiddon, specific capital is associated with
2 This argument originates in the work of Habakkuk (1962) and the induced innovation literature of the 1960s.
3As Goldin (1998) has noted, the first of these was probably quantitatively substantially more important in
lifting average educational attainment than the later expansion of college education.
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the sector that employed a worker's parents, and technical progress tends to destroy some of
that capital, as in the current model. However, technology is always skill-biased in the sense
that high-ability workers always enjoy a comparative advantage in the modern sector.
Section Two of the paper presents the simplest possible model of the transition to skill-biased
technical change, taking the rate of technical progress as exogenous. Section Three endogenises
the rate of technical progress by incorporating the model of Section Two into an endogenous
growth model similar to Caballero and Jaffe (1993) or Aghion and Howitt (1998). Section
Four considers the implications of the model for the provision of education, and in particular
the shift to formal pre-work, and often state-provided, education. Section Five concludes and
discusses some possible directions for future research.
3.2 A Simple Model
3.2.1 The Environment
Consumption
Consider an OLG economy consisting of a fixed population of agents of unit mass, each of whom
lives for two periods, consuming at the end of the second, and in which there is a continuum of
intermediate goods, indexed on the unit interval. Utility is linear in the final good, which is
produced (costlessly) as a CES aggregate of the intermediate goods,
1
C= I Xdi)
Each good i is potentially available in a range of qualities indexed by k, all of which are perfect
substitutes for each other, so that
ci = Eqi (k)ci(k).
k
where qi (k) is the quality of vintage k of good i and Ci (k) is the quantity of it consumed. Note
that, since different qualities of the same good are perfect substitutes, if the quality of one
vintage is A > times that of an earlier vintage, the earlier vintage will be consumed only if its
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price is 1/A the price of the newer vintage (or less).
Production
Perfectly competitive firms in industry i produce goods of quality qi (k) qi (kimaX), where
qi (k? 'X) is the quality of good i associated with the highest available vintage of good i. An
innovation in industry i at time t allows production of good i at the frontier quality, qa,
regardless of how many innovations had previously occured in the industry. The quality of the
frontier increases exogenously at a constant proportional rate A, so that
qmax = Aq maxqt l t-.
Innovations are spread randomly across industries, and occur with probability z at the start of
each period. Since in equilibrium only the best available quality of any good will be produced,
I shall refer to any industry which in period t produces a good of quality qm'x as a modern
industry. Any industry in which in period t, qi (kmaX) < qmax is called an old or a traditional
industry. Since in equilibrium only the best available vintage of good i is produced, for
notational simplicity I will generally denote that quality simply qi.
Production of each good i requires labor and is carried out by perfectly competitive, constant
returns to scale firms. One efficiency unit of any type of labor produces one unit of the
intermediate good.
Labor Market
Of the unit mass of agents, H are high ability, while L = 1 - ft are low ability. In the first
period of their life, workers costlessly acquire skills to be used in the second period of their life,
at; the end of which they consume their earnings.
As a result of their learning, each low ability worker supplies one efficiency unit of labor to
any old industry (that is, q < qmaX) and < efficiency units of labor to a modern industry
(qi = qmax). The loss of efficiency in the new industry reflects the lack of familarity of the low
skill worker with the techniques used in the modern industry. Denote the wage of a low-skill
worker working in sector i by wL (i).
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Each high-skill worker can choose what sort of human capital to acquire. One choice is to
specialize in producing good i using an existing technology. Clearly, in equilibrium this will be
the best available technology, q. Working in this sector, each specialized worker provides s > 1
efficiency units of labor. If they work in any other industry or using any other technology,
their effective labor supply is the same as that of an unskilled worker. Denote the wage of a
skilled worker with specific skills by w H .
The other choice is to acquire general training that is equally useful in working on any good
or any technology, including modern technologies. A high-skill worker with general training
provides g efficiency units of labor to any sector, where 1 < g < s. Denote the wage of a
general-skill worker w~.
Since the labor market is competitive, each worker is paid the value of their production, so
that a worker in industry i supplying ei efficiency units of labor, which produces a good of price
pi, receives a wage
wi (ei) = piei. (3.1)
3.2.2 Equilibrium
Goods Market
From the consumer's maximization problem, it is straightforward to show that demand for good
i takes the form
-1 p
1-p 1-p
ci =Pi qi y
where y is the consumer's income. Since preferences are homothetic and there are constant
returns to scale, aggregate demand must be
_1P
xi = pil-P qi'-PE,i .a
where E is aggregate expenditure. That is, consumption of each intermediate is declining in
its price and increasing in its quality.
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Labor Supply: Sectoral Choice
Since each worker (of a given type) can produce the same amount of any good using a technology
that is at least one period old, all such goods will have the same price, which I normalize to
unity. Similarly, all new goods will also have the same price as each other, p.
Consider now the choice of sector and technology for workers, taking prices as fixed. By
equation 3.1, low skill workers receive a wage that is identically one by normalization in any
old industry, and a wage p6 in any new industry. Therefore, low-skill wages are
wL = max {p6, 1}.
Accordingly, all low-skill workers work in the modern sector if p > 1/6 > 1, while they are
indifferent if p = 1/6. High skill workers whose technology has not become obsolete work in
their own sector so long as
s >p6
while high-skill workers who have specialised in good i and whose technology has become
obsolete work with the new technology if
Pi (qm ~X) 6 > Pi (qi (ki,t- 1)) s.
where q (kt_) is the best quality of good i that was available in the previous period. If good
i was of frontier quality both last period and this period, the greatest price the old vintage
can command is p/A. It follows that high-skill workers whose technology has become obsolete
always work with the new technology if
s < 6A.
Finally, general skill workers work in the new sector so long as
pg > g.
The key point arising from these comparisons is that general skill workers are prepared to work
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in the new sector so long as goods in the new sector are at least as expensive as goods in the
old sector, while low-skilled workers work in the new sector only if its goods command strictly
higher prices than goods in the old sector.
It is now convenient to make the following two assumptions.
Assumption A5 A > s This assumption ensures that even workers who have specialised
in the most modern technology available in time t - 1, but whose technology has been super-
seded, prefer to work as low-skill workers in the modern sector. Improvements in technology
are sufficiently great so that any specialized high-skill worker whose technology has become
obsolescent prefers to work as an unskilled worker in the new technology, rather than continue
to use the old technology.
Assumption A6 s/1 > g/6 The advantage of specialized high-skilled workers over low-
skilled workers in the old sector is greater than the advantage of generalist high-skilled workers
over low-skilled workers working in the new sector.
Assumption Al is important chiefly in simplifying the presentation of the results. Assump-
tion A6 is more substantive, since without it high-skilled workers always enjoy a comparative
advantage in the modern sector. One implication of the assumption will be seen to be that
steady-state inequality is lower in states with high rates of technical progress than in those with
low rates of technical progress. This seems to be a reasonable description of historical reality.
Nevertheless, whether this assumption is true is ultimately an empirical question.
Labor Supply: Education Choice
Taking these decisions into consideration, it remains to solve for high-skilled workers' choice
between general and specific education. Workers maximize their expected utility, which given
the form of utility function is equivalent to maximizing their expected wage (workers are risk
neutral with the CES utility function, since it is homogeneous of degree one). The expected
wage of a specific-skill worker is
Ew = (1-) + ZWL.
104
A general skill worker works in whichever sector has the highest price, and their wage is
WG = max {g, pg}.
Although in steady state the rate of technical change will depend only on A, for convenience
I will refer to an increase in z interchangeably as either an increase in creative destruction or
an increase in the rate of technical progress.
To solve for equilibrium, consider an economy in which there is no technical change. Then
all goods will effectively be old goods, and obviously the return to acquiring specific skills is
strictly greater than the return to acquiring general skills, since s > g. Since all workers are
producing the same set of goods, the wage premium is just
EwH
wL
Now consider some small rate of technical change, . The chance of a high-skilled worker
being adversely affected by this small amount of creative destruction is very small, and hence
high-skilled workers continue strictly to prefer to acquire specific skills. The new good can
be produced by some low-skill worker, who can produce a units of the good. It is clear that
since any unskilled worker can produce the good equally well, all the unskilled workers must be
indifferent between producing a new good and producing one of the old goods. Hence, in this
case, which I shall refer to as case 1,
Pi= 1 (3.2)
How does the wage premium change in response to this small deviation? Clearly, the wage of
unskilled workers in terms of old goods is still unity. The expected wage of skilled workers in
terms of old goods is, however, slightly less than s because of the creative destruction involved
in technical change. Hence,
EwH = (1- s)s+ el < s.
Note, however, that the expected wage is still strictly greater than the wage gained by a general-
skill worker, so high-skill workers all acquire specific skills.
As z grows, one of two things may happen. First, all specific-skill workers may be drawn
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into the new sector, with the result that the relative price of new goods climbs above 1/a.
Second, at some point high-skill workers become indifferent between acquiring general and
specific-skills, as they expect to lose more and more of their specific skills through obsolescence.
This occurs at the value of z, z*, such that
(1-z*) s + z*wL = pg.
Assuming that low-skill workers have not yet entirely specialised in the new sector, the critical
value of z* must be
5 - gZ* 6s-g
3s -d5
For values of z > z*, high-skill workers will be indifferent between working in the new and old
sector only if
P2 (1z) s + z (3.3)
9
In general, of course, equations 3.2 and 3.3 will not be simultaneously satisfied. It follows
that either low-skilled or high-skilled workers can be indifferent between sectors, but not both.
Since P2 is declining in z but P1 is not, it follows that for z > z*, low-skill workers must strictly
prefer to work in the old sector.
As z continues to increase above z*, equilibrium requires that more and more high-skill
workers work in the new sector. It may seem that for z > z*, further increases in z should
raise the wage premium, since the modern sector is the skill-intensive sector. This is not
true, however, because skilled workers must still be indifferent between entering the modern
sector and gaining specific skills in the traditional sector. Thus, for some range of rates of
technical progress greater than z*, relative prices are pinned down by equation 3.3 and thus
are declining in z. Increases in z push more high-skilled workers into general education and
the modern sector, but this reduces prices of new goods enough so that general skill workers
are still left (relatively) worse off with faster technical progress. Hence, increases in the rate of
technical progress continue to hurt the relative position of skilled workers even after they come
to dominate production of new goods.
As z increases further, one of two things may happen. First, it may become so risky to
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acquire specific skills that all high-skill workers instead acquire general skills, even if they expect
to work in the traditional sector. This transition occurs at z** such that
(1-z**) + z** = g
-s-gZ** s-gs-1
Increases in z beyond z** obviously do not change the skill premium, since in this case it
must be equal to g. Of course, in this case the price of new goods must also fall to unity, the
same as the price of old goods.
Eventually, for some value of z, z***, high-skill workers must specialise in working in the
new sector. Only for z > z*** does an increase in z increase the skill premium. This is because
the effect on relative prices is now positive, as scarcity of skilled workers limits supply of new
goods relative to old goods. However, note that the price of new goods can never rise above P1,
since that would cause low-skill workers to re-enter the market for modern goods. Hence, even
very high rates of creative destruction, although they can increase the skill premium, cannot
increase the skill premium beyond its initial level.
Therefore, the key result to emerge from the simple model is that the effect of changes in
the rate of technical progress on the wage premium is U-shaped. For low rates of creative
destruction, it is optimal for skilled workers to invest heavily in skills specific to a particular
production process. For high rates of creative destruction, it is optimal for skilled workers
to invest instead in skills that make them more adaptable. One implication of this simple
model is that; relative employment intensities in different sectors also depend on the rate of
creative destruction. When creative destruction is low, the modern sector is unskill-intensive.
When it is high, it is skill intensive. Interestingly, the turning point with respect to wages
does not coincide with the turning point with respect to employment. There exist a range of
values of creative destruction such that, although the modern sector is general-skill intensive,
nevertheless further increases in the rate of creative destruction still reduce the relative wage of
skilled workers. Increases in creative destruction increase the relative wage of skilled workers
only after high-skilled workers have not merely joined the modern sector, but have actually
specialised in it.
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3.3 Endogenous Technical Progress
The simple model above suggested why the skill-bias of technological change might depend on
the rate of creative destruction itself. However, it is not very satisfactory to treat the rate
of creative destruction as entirely exogenous, particularly if costs of research depend partly on
the cost of hiring high-skilled workers to perform the research. The following section therefore
develops a more fully fledged model that endogenises the rate of creative destruction.
Consider the same productive structure as before, with two modifications. First, there is
now also a research sector, which can produce new ideas. Research is assumed to be high skill
intensive, and successful research is rewarded with a one-period patent. In particular, assume
that each individual firm is small and that the probability of success is proportional to X (HR),
where HR is the mass of high-skilled workers in the research sector. (HR) is a function that
relates the individual firm's likelihood of discovering a patent to the overall amount of research
being conducted in the economy, by HR researchers. Assume that 4' (HR) < 0, which allows
for social decreasing returns to scale in research, perhaps because of unmodelled heterogeneity
between particular researchers.4 The aggregate rate of creative destruction is therefore
Z (HR) =HRO (HR),
where z' >0, and z(0) =0, lim z(HR) = 1.
HR--0o
Second, the rate of progress of the frontier is now determined by the exent of creative
destruction, so that
qmax,t = qmax,t-1 (1 - )- -' , where y > 1.
This specification is needed so that the rate of technical progress is determined by the rate of
creative destruction. This specification is the discrete time analogue of that in continuous time
considered by Caballero and Jaffe (1993) and Aghion and Howitt (1998). A similar argument
to that found in Aghion and Howitt (1998) establishes that in the long run the cross sectoral
4 This specification is similar to that in Acemoglu (1998) and for horizontal research in Howitt (1999).
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distribution of industry productivity is determined by the cumulative distribution function
1 (a) = a (3.4)
1,x1- z)
where a = . Without the endogeneity of the rate of progress, the cdf converges to a In A
qmax
With a constant distribution of relative productivities, as occurs in either case in steady state,
the growth rate is determined purely by the rate of growth of the frontier. Hence, unless the
rate of the growth of the frontier responds to the rate of creative destruction, increases in the
rate of creative destruction can only raise the level of income in the long-run, but not its growth
rate. Importantly, with a steady-state distribution of productivities, it is straightforward to
show that C must increase at the same rate as q, and hence demand for good i can be rewritten
as
Xi (a) = l- a p -P E (3.5)
where E is aggregate expenditure, which is constant with respect to changes in quality in
steady state. Demand for good i, xi, of vintage a - -qi can therefore be expressed simply asqmax
a function of price and relative quality.
Monopolists maximize profits subject to the demand curve in equation 3.5. As usual,
this leads to monopolists (who sell only new goods, XN) setting PN = MC, where MC is the
marginal cost of production. 5 There are now four possible configurations of workers across
industries, leaving aside high-skilled workers in the research sector. Each type of worker can
specialize in one industry, for example all non-research high-skilled workers work as specialists
in the traditional sector and all low-skilled workers work in the modern sector. Alternatively,
one type of worker can specialize and the other can be indifferent between industries. As in
the simple model, it should intuitively be clear that, in increasing order of creative destruction,
first, high-skilled workers will specialize in the traditional sector and low-skilled workers will
be indifferent between sectors (in equilibrium). Depending on parameters, there may exist a
range of creative destruction rates over which low-skill workers all work in the modern sector.
5If the growth rate is sufficiently low, the size of each technical step may not be enough to allow all the new
monopolists to price existing producers out of the market at this price, and hence some may adopt limit pricing.
In what follows, I ignore this possibility, which in any event affects only the small number of sectors that have
innovated both this period and in a recent period.
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Past a critical value of z, low-skill workers switch and specialize in the traditional sectors, while
high-skill workers may be indifferent between sectors. Finally, high-skill workers may specialize
in the modern sector.
For simplicity, I assume that parameters are such that there are enough low-skill workers
so that they never specialize in the modern sector. This assumption guarantees that the wage
of low-skilled workers is equal to the price of old goods, and is therefore always equal to unity.
Equilibrium can therefore be described in terms of demand for, and supply of, skilled workers
for the research sector. Before proceeding, it is worth noting the timing of events in the
economy. In the first period of life, workers acquire skills. At the start of the second period,
workers find employment in either a modern or traditional sector, or in the research sector.
Research is then carried out, and its results are available immediately. Research workers,
however, cannot work in production in the rest of the period. Production then occurs, and at
the end of the period old agents consume. The convention that research occurs at the end of
the period is convenient in that it enables equilibrium to be solved in a static setting, but is
not otherwise important to the results.
3.3.1 Equilibrium
Demand for Research Labor
The demand for skilled labor in the research sector is pinned down by the zero profit condition,
q(HR) 7r = WH.
It is straightforward to show that ex post profits are
7 = MCxn ( (3.6)
where marginal cost of production is
MC = min { } (3.7)
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Moreover, using equation 3.5, and setting a = 1, together with the fact that aggregate expen-
diture is equal to gross wages and that prices of old goods are equal to one, demand for skilled
labor in the research sector can be solved for as
(HR) MC 1-P (1-p) p-P (L + WH H) = WH
Therefore, the demand curve is
L+wHH (1~p)(3p)T_ if wH > 0(HR) =W)'(-)4 -= 1~~~~(w)Tp if w H <
L+wHH- (1p)(gp)T p
It is easy to verify that the demand curve is downward sloping so long as ' < 0. The
standard scale effect is present, in that an increase in aggregate expenditure shifts the demand
curve to the right. An increase in monopoly power increases the rate of technical progress,
other things being equal.
Supply of Research Labor
Skilled workers will be prepared to work in the research sector so long as they earn their expected
opportunity cost of working in some part of the production sector. This will be equal to the
greatest of either their expected wage given that they have specialist skills, or their actual wage
if they have general skills. The resulting supply curve will be very similar to that in the simple
model in which the rate of technical progress was exogenous. As in that case, it is easiest to
solve for the supply curve by considering progressively increasing rates of technical change.
At very low rates of technical change, demand for skilled labor in the research sector will
be low, and demand for any type of labor in the modern production sector will also be low.
Therefore, both high and low-skilled workers will work in the traditional sector, and the wages
of each type will be determined by their expected wages in this sector. Hence, low skill workers
receive a wage of unity and high-skilled workers receive a wage of s, although the expected wage
of specialist high-skill workers is
wH = (1-z) + Z. (3.8)
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For sufficiently low rates of technical progress, firms in the modern sector therefore hire low-skill
workers and pay them their opportunity cost, unity. The supply of workers to the research
sector is determined by equation 3.8.
As already highlighted in equation 3.7, for a sufficiently high rate of technical progress, it
will be cheaper for the modern sector to employ generalist high-skilled workers than to employ
low-skilled workers. This occurs at the value of z, z*, such that
(1-z*)s+z* 1
g 6
3* - g* 6s-g
6(s- 1),
However, the bulk of high-skill workers, who continue to work in the traditional sector, still
prefer to acquire specific skills, since g/6 > g. Hence, the supply condition for the research
sector remains unchanged, despite the factor-intensity reversal in the modern sector.
The important feature of the supply curve up to the point HR (z**) is that it is downward
sloping: an expansion of the research sector leaves skilled workers worse off. Intuitively, the
reason for this is that skilled workers anticipate that there is an increasing chance that their
skills will become obsolete next period. Therefore, they are prepared to work in the modern
sector for a lower wage than at lower rates of technical progress.
The supply condition changes only once the rate of technical progress is sufficiently great
that skilled workers working in the traditional sector prefer to acquire general skills than face
the risk of obsolescence with specific skills. That is,
(1-z**)s+z** = g
Z** s-g
s-i1
For rates of technical progress greater than z**, the research sector therefore needs to pay skilled
workers g. (Note that z** > z* so long as < 1.)
At sufficiently high rates of technical progress, the modern sector and research sector to-
gether demand all of the skilled labor available in the economy. However, expanding output
in the modern sector would involve hiring low-skilled workers, driving the marginal cost of
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production up to 1/6, and therefore, in a competitive labor market, high-skilled wages up to
g/6. Whether high-skilled wages go all the way to this level is determined by the zero-profit
condition. That is, there is effectively a vertical segment of the supply curve at the critical
value of technical progress. This is the value of HR for which
xn-z- + HR = Hor
9
HR [0 (HR) (L + gH) g 1-P P +1] = H
Thus, to the left of the critical value of HR, skilled labor is available to the research sector at a
cost of g, while to the right it is available at a cost of g/6. At HR, the supply curve is vertical.
Note that beyond HR, the wage premium, g/6 , remains lower than the wage premium when
there was no technical progress, by assumption A6, that s > g/a.
3.3.2 Discussion
One possible configuration of parameters is depicted in Figure 3.1. The supply curve is the
light line, SS, while the demand curve is the heavy line, DD. There is a kink in the supply curve
at Hk, the value of HR associated with z*, because marginal costs of production are constant
up to this point (and reflect costs of unskilled labor) and falling after this point, reflecting the
falling cost of skilled labor. Moreover, there is a discontinuity in demand at Hr** because
skilled workers absorb all productivity increases at this point, with the result that there is no
change in the amount of labor devoted to research at this point.
The main comparative statics relate to the productivity of research and the endowment
of skilled labor. Clearly, greater productivity of research or a greater endowment of skilled
labor both shift the demand curve up, the latter purely through the standard scale effect, and
therefore raise the rate of technical progress. Note that greater research productivity also shifts
the supply curve to the left, since fewer research workers are needed in order to produce the
same amount of technical change.
One consequence of the fact that over a certain range both the supply and demand curves
slope down is that multiple equilibria arise quite naturally in this context, without any need to
appeal to externalities. In Figure 3.2, a case is presented in which there are three equilibria.
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Figure 3-1: Equilibrium Rate of Technical Progress
The equilibrium at the intermediate rate of technical progress is of course unstable, while the
other two equilibria are stable. In this setting, expectations of other agents' actions alone
determine whether the economy experiences slow, deskilling technical change or intermediate,
skill-neutral technical change.
3.4 Education Provision
One of the key insights of labor economics into the provision of education and training, dating
from Becker (1964), is that employers will be prepared to pay for workers to acquire specific
skills, but not for them to acquire general skills. Applying this insight to the current model
suggests an explanation for the demise of apprenticeship-type training and the rise of pre-market
training in the modern world. In particular, the timing of the high-school movement, at almost
precisely the same time as it appears the modern sector first became relatively skill-intensive, is
consistent with this model, as is the continued compression of the wage premium at that time.
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Figure 3-2: Multiple Equilibrium Rates of Technical Progress
The following discussion provides a sketch of the issues involved in this extension to the
model.
To make the problem interesting, assume that there is no credit market, so workers cannot
pay for the cost of any training they receive in the first period of their life. Moreover, assume
that there are costs c and cg of receiving training, that must be paid up front. Assume that
contracts binding employers to pay a certain wage in the future, conditional on continuing in
business, are binding, but that bonded labor is impossible.
In the product market, suppose that, although the patent expires after the first period,
there is an E entry cost into any particular industry. Then an equilibrium involves a monopolist
pricing at the competitive price. However, the monopolist is now ex post a monopsony purchaser
of the specific skills associated with their industry. Then the wage of each worker will be bid
up to s - cs in the next period, conditional on the company remaining open.
Just as in the standard Becker model, however, firms will not be prepared to pay the cost of
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training general skill workers, since they can always bid them away from companies that have
already trained them. The obvious solution to this problem is to impose a tax on production
and subsidise the provision of general education. However, this only becomes necessary after
high-skilled labor starts to work in the modern sector, that is, after the rate of technical progress
has advanced beyond z*.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has used a simple model to argue that changes in skills may be just as important as
changes in technology in explaining the effect of technology on the relative demand for skilled
labor. In the simple model, there was a U-shaped relationship between the rate of creative
destruction (and therefore also the rate of technical progress) and the return to skills. Low
rates of creative destruction mainly had the effect of reducing the expected value of skills tied
to specific tasks. High rates of creative destruction led skilled workers to invest instead in skills
that would enable them to adapt easily to new technologies and circumstances.
This theory is consistent with the observed changes in the skill-bias of technical change over
time. In historical perspective, the Industrial Revolution and even most of the Nineteenth
Century involved surprisingly low rates of TFP growth, although even these rates were sub-
stantially higher than those that had gone before. Yet these changes were sufficient to cause
large changes in the demand for labor and a general perception amongst observers as disparate
as Ricardo and Marx that technology was deskilling. Certainly, workers in the modern sector,
often women and children, tended to be less skilled than the experienced artisans they often
replaced. Around the turn of the twentieth century, the rate of technical progress appears to
have accelerated, and, as best we can judge, workers in the modern sector started to be bet-
ter educated than the average of the workforce as a whole. Nevertheless, the early twentieth
century was, if anything, a period when the wage premium continued to fall rather than rise.
One reason that has often been cited for this is the contemporaneous dramatic expansion in
high-school education. This paper suggests a new link between the accelerated rate of technical
progress and the timing of the high-school movement, that is consistent with contemporaneous
changes in both the skill-intensity of different industries and the wage premium. During the
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second half of the twentieth century, skilled employment continued to be concentrated in the
modern sector, and TFP growth rates increased further still. This probably coincides with
what appears in the model as specialization of skilled workers in general capital and the modern
sector. Of course, the exact interpretation of increased inequality in recent decades depends
on the interpretation of the evidence on technical change during this period.
There are a number of interesting directions for future research. Section Four of the paper
sketched the first of these, which is to link changes in the rate of technical progress more
explicitly with changes in the provision of education. In particular, applying the insights
of Becker (1964), education can be expected to move from on-the-job training provided by
employers to pre-market training, perhaps with an important role for the state.
Another interesting possibility is to consider the implications of trade in this model. In
particular, unlike in Krueger and Kumar (2004), it is possible that differences in acquisition
rates of general and specific skills could lead to differences in the level of output but not in
the growth rate. Moreover, with technological spillovers, countries that are less technologically
progressive might nevertheless achieve high per capita output by specialising in slightly older
industries. This could potentially help explain the emphasis in some European countries such
as Germany on specific skills, coupled with high rates of labor productivity, as against the
emphasis on general skills in the more dynamic US labor market.
Finally, it would be interesting to reproduce the pattern of comparative advantage assumed
here in Assumption A6 endogenously through complementarity in the production function.
The most likely way in which this might be achieved is to create a dual index model of ability,
whereby there is an idiosyncratic component in the choice of each worker as to whether to
acquire general or specific skills. This would also yield additional insight into the pattern of
relative wages within the class of skilled workers.
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